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Information about:
Carlos Pimienta

Personal Details | Affiliation | Lists | Works
This is information that was supplied by Carlos Pimienta in registering through RePEc. If you are Carlos Pimienta , you may change this information at RePEc. Or if you are not registered and would like to be listed as well, register at RePEc. When you register or update your RePEc registration, you may identify the papers and articles you have authored.

Other registered authors

Personal Details

First Name: Carlos
Middle Name:
Last Name: Pimienta
Suffix:

RePEc Short-ID: pgo143

Email:
Homepage: http://research.economics.unsw.edu.au/cpimienta
Postal Address: School of Economics, Australian School of Business, The University of New South Wales, UNSW Sydney 2052, Sydney NSW, AUSTRALIA
Phone: +61 2 9385 3358

Affiliation

(in no particular order)

Lists

This author is featured on the following reading lists or publication compilations:
  1. Universidad Carlos III de Madrid Economics PhD Alumni

Works

| Working papers | Articles | Access and download statistics | Citations (if any)| NEP Fields |
Download all references for this author: available formats: HTML (with abstracts), plain text (with abstracts), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF

Working papers

  1. Carlos Pimienta, 2009. "Bayesian and Consistent Assessments," Discussion Papers 2009-13, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales. [Downloadable!]

  2. Francesco De Sinopoli & Carlos Pimienta, 2009. "Costly Network Formation and Regular Equilibria," Discussion Papers 2009-05, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales. [Downloadable!]

  3. Francesco De Sionopoli & Carlos Gonzalez Pimienta, 2007. "Undominated (and) perfect equilibria in Poisson games," Economics Working Papers we073117, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

  4. Carlos Pimienta, 2007. "Generic Finiteness of Outcome Distributions for Two Person Game Forms with Three Outcomes," Discussion Papers 2007-20, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales. [Downloadable!]

  5. Carlos Pimienta, 2007. "Generic Determinacy of Nash Equilibrium in Network Formation Games," Discussion Papers 2007-31, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

  6. J. Carlos Gonzalez-Pimienta & Cristian M. Litan, 2005. "On The Equivalence Between Subgame Perfection And Sequentiality," Economics Working Papers we052616, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]

Articles

  1. De Sinopoli, Francesco & Pimienta, Carlos, 2009. "Undominated (and) perfect equilibria in Poisson games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 775-784, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

  2. Pimienta, Carlos, 2009. "Generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in network-formation games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 920-927, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

  3. Carlos Pimienta & Cristian Litan, 2008. "Conditions for equivalence between sequentiality and subgame perfection," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 539-553, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

NEP Fields

5 papers by this author were announced in NEP, and specifically in the following field reports (number of papers):
  1. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (5) 2005-05-07 2007-06-02 2008-02-09 2008-02-16 2009-07-03 Author is listed
  2. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (1) 2008-02-09
  3. NEP-NET: Network Economics (2) 2008-02-09 2009-07-03 Author is listed
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This page was last updated on 2010-1-25.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.