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Monetary Costs Versus Opportunity Costs in a Voting Experiment

Author

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  • Yoichi Hizen

    (School of Economics and Management, Kochi University of Technology)

  • Kengo Kurosaka

    (Hiroshima Shudo University)

Abstract

Monetary incentives are widely used to reproduce various voting environments in the laboratory. In actual elections, however, non-monetary opportunity costs play a role in voter turnout. Our research question was two-fold; whether the effect of opportunity costs on voter turnout differs from the effect of monetary costs, and if so, to what extent they differ. To generate opportunity costs, we asked participants to work on tasks for two minutes; they were rewarded for successful task completions but lost thirty seconds if they chose to vote. Our regression analysis suggested that nearly half of the participants’ decisions took account of opportunity costs as well as monetary costs, and that for such decisions, the effect of opportunity costs on voter turnout was about one-third of the effect of monetary costs. These observations attribute the “paradox of voter turnout†to the misperception and/or depreciation of voting costs.

Suggested Citation

  • Yoichi Hizen & Kengo Kurosaka, 2021. "Monetary Costs Versus Opportunity Costs in a Voting Experiment," Working Papers SDES-2021-1, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Feb 2021.
  • Handle: RePEc:kch:wpaper:sdes-2021-1
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    File URL: http://www.souken.kochi-tech.ac.jp/seido/wp/SDES-2021-1.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Laboratory experiment; Monetary incentives; Opportunity cost; Paradox of voter turnout; Finite mixture model;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D90 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - General

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