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Games and Economic Behavior
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2013, Volume 78, Issue C
- 1-20 Menstrual cycle and competitive bidding
by Pearson, Matthew & Schipper, Burkhard C. - 21-30 The informational divide
by Nermuth, Manfred & Pasini, Giacomo & Pin, Paolo & Weidenholzer, Simon - 31-43 A dynamic epistemic characterization of backward induction without counterfactuals
by Bonanno, Giacomo - 44-63 How to win a large election
by Mandler, Michael - 64-71 A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment
by Forges, Françoise - 72-84 Whose opinion counts? Implementation by sortition
by Saran, Rene & Tumennasan, Norovsambuu - 85-102 Candidate strategies in primaries and general elections with candidates of heterogeneous quality
by Hummel, Patrick - 103-120 Using or hiding private information? An experimental study of zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information
by Jacquemet, Nicolas & Koessler, Frédéric
2013, Volume 77, Issue 1
- 1-20 Optimal allocation without transfer payments
by Chakravarty, Surajeet & Kaplan, Todd R. - 21-40 Admissibility and event-rationality
by Barelli, Paulo & Galanis, Spyros - 41-60 Gift exchange and the separation of ownership and control
by Maximiano, Sandra & Sloof, Randolph & Sonnemans, Joep - 61-76 Brothers in arms – An experiment on the alliance puzzle
by Ke, Changxia & Konrad, Kai A. & Morath, Florian - 77-89 Coordinating adoption decisions under externalities and incomplete information
by Aoyagi, Masaki - 90-99 Choice by sequential procedures
by Apesteguia, Jose & Ballester, Miguel A. - 100-121 Unawareness, beliefs, and speculative trade
by Heifetz, Aviad & Meier, Martin & Schipper, Burkhard C. - 122-137 Enforcement of contribution norms in public good games with heterogeneous populations
by Reuben, Ernesto & Riedl, Arno - 138-152 To err is human: Implementation in quantal response equilibria
by Tumennasan, Norovsambuu - 153-167 The communication burden of payment determination
by Babaioff, Moshe & Blumrosen, Liad & Schapira, Michael - 168-180 Minimax play by teams
by Okano, Yoshitaka - 181-213 Why canʼt a woman bid more like a man?
by Chen, Yan & Katuščák, Peter & Ozdenoren, Emre - 214-228 Bribing in first-price auctions
by Rachmilevitch, Shiran - 229-246 The effect of link costs on simple buyer–seller networks
by Doğan, Gönül & van Assen, Marcel & Potters, Jan - 247-270 Auctions with a profit sharing contract
by Abhishek, Vineet & Hajek, Bruce & Williams, Steven R. - 271-283 Legitimate punishment, feedback, and the enforcement of cooperation
by Faillo, Marco & Grieco, Daniela & Zarri, Luca - 284-297 Truth, justice, and cake cutting
by Chen, Yiling & Lai, John K. & Parkes, David C. & Procaccia, Ariel D. - 298-320 Reversibility in dynamic coordination problems
by Kováč, Eugen & Steiner, Jakub - 321-344 Profit-seeking punishment corrupts norm obedience
by Xiao, Erte - 345-351 Optimal value commitment in bilateral bargaining
by Britz, Volker - 352-366 Optimism, delay and (in)efficiency in a stochastic model of bargaining
by Ortner, Juan - 367-376 Robustness of intermediate agreements and bargaining solutions
by Anbarci, Nejat & Sun, Ching-jen - 377-404 Multi-task incentive contract and performance measurement with multidimensional types
by Meng, Dawen & Tian, Guoqiang
2012, Volume 76, Issue 2
- 355-374 On price taking behavior in a nonrenewable resource cartel–fringe game
by Benchekroun, Hassan & Withagen, Cees - 375-390 Justifiable choice
by Heller, Yuval - 391-419 On dynamic compromise
by Bowen, T. Renee & Zahran, Zaki - 420-438 Smooth multibidding mechanisms
by Pérez-Castrillo, David & Quérou, Nicolas - 439-456 Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case
by Lavi, Ron & Oren, Sigal - 457-470 Digit ratios, the menstrual cycle and social preferences
by Buser, Thomas - 471-494 Modelling change in individual characteristics: An axiomatic framework
by Dietrich, Franz - 495-514 Bargaining with random implementation: An experimental study
by Anbarci, Nejat & Feltovich, Nick - 519-534 Coordination need not be a problem
by Dutta, Prajit K. - 535-547 Endogenous information and stochastic contracts
by Terstiege, Stefan - 548-555 Social norms and trust among strangers
by Xie, Huan & Lee, Yong-Ju - 556-570 The probability of nontrivial common knowledge
by Collevecchio, Andrea & LiCalzi, Marco - 571-581 A folk theorem for repeated games with unequal discounting
by Chen, Bo & Takahashi, Satoru - 582-595 When does aggregation reduce risk aversion?
by Chambers, Christopher P. & Echenique, Federico - 596-610 Alternating-offer games with final-offer arbitration
by Rong, Kang - 611-635 Efficiency and synergy in a multi-unit auction with and without package bidding: An experimental study
by Chernomaz, Kirill & Levin, Dan - 636-647 Optimal collusion under imperfect monitoring in multimarket contact
by Kobayashi, Hajime & Ohta, Katsunori - 648-664 Jump bidding and overconcentration in decentralized simultaneous ascending auctions
by Zheng, Charles Z. - 665-677 Consistency of the Harsanyi NTU configuration value
by Hinojosa, M.A. & Romero, E. & Zarzuelo, J.M. - 678-689 Deconstruction and reconstruction of an anomaly
by Engelmann, Dirk & Strobel, Martin - 690-710 On the effects of joint bidding in independent private value auctions: An experimental study
by Chernomaz, Kirill - 711-737 A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network
by Laclau, Marie - 738-752 Pragmatic languages with universal grammars
by Hernández, Penélope & Urbano, Amparo & Vila, José E. - 753-772 Representing equilibrium aggregates in aggregate games with applications to common agency
by Martimort, David & Stole, Lars
2012, Volume 75, Issue 2
- 449-463 Beliefs and endogenous cognitive levels: An experimental study
by Agranov, Marina & Potamites, Elizabeth & Schotter, Andrew & Tergiman, Chloe - 464-480 Candidate quality in a Downsian model with a continuous policy space
by Aragonès, Enriqueta & Xefteris, Dimitrios - 481-489 Relative concave utility for risk and ambiguity
by Baillon, Aurélien & Driesen, Bram & Wakker, Peter P. - 490-509 Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: On what domains are they also sufficient?
by Barberà, Salvador & Berga, Dolors & Moreno, Bernardo - 510-517 A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender–receiver games
by Blume, Andreas - 518-537 Ambiguous beliefs and mechanism design
by Bodoh-Creed, Aaron L. - 538-554 Stochastic stability in best shot network games
by Boncinelli, Leonardo & Pin, Paolo - 555-569 Strategic reasoning in p-beauty contests
by Breitmoser, Yves - 570-586 Cooperative strategies in anonymous economies: An experiment
by Camera, Gabriele & Casari, Marco & Bigoni, Maria - 587-597 A structure theorem for rationalizability in the normal form of dynamic games
by Chen, Yi-Chun - 598-612 Transparency, complementarity and holdout
by Roy Chowdhury, Prabal & Sengupta, Kunal - 613-624 What money canʼt buy: Efficient mechanism design with costly signals
by Condorelli, Daniele - 625-638 A dynamic Ellsberg urn experiment
by Dominiak, Adam & Duersch, Peter & Lefort, Jean-Philippe - 639-645 Testing substitutability
by Hatfield, John William & Immorlica, Nicole & Kominers, Scott Duke - 646-667 Deliberative democracy and electoral competition
by Hummel, Patrick - 668-684 Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players
by Jara-Moroni, Pedro - 685-693 School choice: Impossibilities for affirmative action
by Kojima, Fuhito - 694-713 The efficiency and stability of R&D networks
by König, Michael D. & Battiston, Stefano & Napoletano, Mauro & Schweitzer, Frank - 714-730 On the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations
by Krasteva, Silvana & Yildirim, Huseyin - 731-751 Optimality and the English and second-price auctions with resale
by Lebrun, Bernard - 752-775 Diffusion and cascading behavior in random networks
by Lelarge, Marc - 776-787 Influence networks
by López-Pintado, Dunia - 788-808 Revisiting log-linear learning: Asynchrony, completeness and payoff-based implementation
by Marden, Jason R. & Shamma, Jeff S. - 809-831 Comparative statics of altruism and spite
by Milchtaich, Igal - 832-841 A common ground for resource and welfare egalitarianism
by Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. & Roemer, John E. - 842-854 Coalitional stochastic stability
by Newton, Jonathan - 855-866 Mean and variance responsive learning
by Oyarzun, Carlos & Sarin, Rajiv - 867-881 The influence relation for ternary voting games
by Parker, Cameron - 882-897 Learning efficient Nash equilibria in distributed systems
by Pradelski, Bary S.R. & Young, H. Peyton - 898-920 Network structure and strategic investments: An experimental analysis
by Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Weitzel, Utz - 921-935 Pattern recognition and subjective belief learning in a repeated constant-sum game
by Spiliopoulos, Leonidas - 936-947 Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare
by Troyan, Peter - 948-963 Let them cheat!
by Velez, Rodrigo A. & Thomson, William - 964-983 Renegotiation and conflict resolution in relational contracting
by Zhao, Rui R. - 984-989 On the correspondence of contracts to salaries in (many-to-many) matching
by Kominers, Scott Duke - 990-999 On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts
by Lamy, Laurent - 1000-1008 Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment
by Nieken, Petra & Schmitz, Patrick W. - 1009-1013 Competitive problem solving and the optimal prize schemes
by Suzuki, Toru - 1014-1024 Long-run equilibria, dominated strategies, and local interactions
by Weidenholzer, Simon
2012, Volume 75, Issue 1
- 1-16 Markov equilibria in a model of bargaining in networks
by Abreu, Dilip & Manea, Mihai - 17-34 Big experimenter is watching you! Anonymity and prosocial behavior in the laboratory
by Barmettler, Franziska & Fehr, Ernst & Zehnder, Christian - 35-52 Forward-looking behavior in Hawk–Dove games in endogenous networks: Experimental evidence
by Berninghaus, Siegfried K. & Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Ott, Marion - 53-66 Potential competition in preemption games
by Bobtcheff, Catherine & Mariotti, Thomas - 67-80 Affective decision making: A theory of optimism bias
by Bracha, Anat & Brown, Donald J. - 81-103 From perception to action: An economic model of brain processes
by Brocas, Isabelle & Carrillo, Juan D. - 104-119 Efficient investment in a dynamic auction environment
by Daley, Brendan & Schwarz, Michael & Sonin, Konstantin - 120-138 Oligopolistic competition in price and quality
by Dubovik, Andrei & Janssen, Maarten C.W. - 139-151 Asymmetric Cost Sharing mechanisms
by Friedman, Eric J. - 152-167 Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: A possibility theorem
by Grüner, Hans Peter & Koriyama, Yukio - 168-184 Endogenous timing in general rent-seeking and conflict models
by Hoffmann, Magnus & Rota-Graziosi, Grégoire - 185-197 Axiomatic and strategic justifications for the constrained equal benefits rule in the airport problem
by Hu, Cheng-Cheng & Tsay, Min-Hung & Yeh, Chun-Hsien - 198-216 Epsilon-equilibria of perturbed games
by Jackson, Matthew O. & Rodriguez-Barraquer, Tomas & Tan, Xu - 217-232 Profit-maximizing matchmaker
by Ko, Chiu Yu & Konishi, Hideo - 233-249 Communication and efficiency in auctions
by Kos, Nenad - 250-264 Competitive dynamic pricing with alternating offers: Theory and experiment
by Mak, Vincent & Rapoport, Amnon & Gisches, Eyran J. - 265-276 Forward induction equilibrium
by Man, Priscilla T.Y. - 277-282 Harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes: A counterexample
by Martins-da-Rocha, V. Filipe & Vailakis, Yiannis - 283-298 Robertsʼ Theorem with neutrality: A social welfare ordering approach
by Mishra, Debasis & Sen, Arunava - 299-318 Evolution of theories of mind
by Mohlin, Erik - 319-336 Gift-exchange, incentives, and heterogeneous workers
by Non, Arjan - 337-353 Characterizing stability properties in games with strategic substitutes
by Roy, Sunanda & Sabarwal, Tarun - 354-371 Learning in games with risky payoffs
by Shafran, Aric P. - 372-401 Stochastic stability in asymmetric binary choice coordination games
by Staudigl, Mathias - 402-412 A new stable and more responsive cost sharing solution for minimum cost spanning tree problems
by Trudeau, Christian - 413-423 Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information
by de Clippel, Geoffroy & Pérez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David - 424-427 Symmetric games with only asymmetric equilibria
by Fey, Mark - 428-434 Dominant strategy implementation of stable rules
by Kumano, Taro & Watabe, Masahiro - 435-440 Two-person ex post implementation
by Ohashi, Yoshihiro - 441-447 Outcome-equivalence of self-confirming equilibrium and Nash equilibrium
by Shimoji, Makoto
2012, Volume 74, Issue 2
- 447-469 The Hotelling–Downs model with runoff voting
by Brusco, Sandro & Dziubiński, Marcin & Roy, Jaideep - 470-485 Buyer groups as strategic commitments
by Dana, James D. - 486-503 Multi-unit auctions with budget limits
by Dobzinski, Shahar & Lavi, Ron & Nisan, Noam - 504-516 Voluntarily separable repeated Prisonerʼs Dilemma with reference letters
by Fujiwara-Greve, Takako & Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro & Suzuki, Nobue - 517-525 How common are common priors?
by Hellman, Ziv & Samet, Dov - 526-540 All-pay war
by Hodler, Roland & Yektaş, Hadi - 541-560 Authority and communication in the laboratory
by Lai, Ernest K. & Lim, Wooyoung - 561-575 Optimal auctions with asymmetric financial externalities
by Lu, Jingfeng - 576-587 When too little is as good as nothing at all: Rationing a disposable good among satiable people with acceptance thresholds
by Manjunath, Vikram - 588-600 On the invariance of the set of Core matchings with respect to preference profiles
by Martínez, Ruth & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro & Oviedo, Jorge - 601-619 Learning across games
by Mengel, Friederike - 620-636 Learning to bid: The design of auctions under uncertainty and adaptation
by Noe, Thomas H. & Rebello, Michael & Wang, Jun - 637-650 Non-bidding equilibrium in an ascending core-selecting auction
by Sano, Ryuji - 651-665 The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule
by Schmitz, Patrick W. & Tröger, Thomas - 666-686 Optimal auctions with information acquisition
by Shi, Xianwen - 687-698 On the accessibility of core-extensions
by Yang, Yi-You - 699-708 A near Pareto optimal auction with budget constraints
by Hafalir, Isa E. & Ravi, R. & Sayedi, Amin - 709-713 Existence of valuation equilibria when equilibrium strategies cannot differentiate between equal ties
by Wichardt, Philipp C.
2012, Volume 74, Issue 1
- 1-11 Property rights and investments: An evolutionary approach
by Andreozzi, Luciano - 12-31 Behavioral spillovers and cognitive load in multiple games: An experimental study
by Bednar, Jenna & Chen, Yan & Liu, Tracy Xiao & Page, Scott - 32-51 Raising juveniles
by Bell, Clive & Gersbach, Hans & Schneider, Maik T. - 52-67 Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities
by Bochet, Olivier & Gordon, Sidartha - 68-82 The collective action problem: Within-group cooperation and between-group competition in a repeated rent-seeking game
by Cheikbossian, Guillaume - 83-101 Dynamic coordination with individual learning
by Dasgupta, Amil & Steiner, Jakub & Stewart, Colin - 102-119 Signaling without a common prior: Results on experimental equilibrium selection
by Drouvelis, Michalis & Müller, Wieland & Possajennikov, Alex - 120-143 Minimum cost arborescences
by Dutta, Bhaskar & Mishra, Debasis - 144-153 Bargaining with revoking costs
by Dutta, Rohan - 154-169 Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
by Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava - 170-183 When less is more: Rationing and rent dissipation in stochastic contests
by Faravelli, Marco & Stanca, Luca - 184-207 Iterated regret minimization: A new solution concept
by Halpern, Joseph Y. & Pass, Rafael - 208-221 Between-game rule learning in dissimilar symmetric normal-form games
by Haruvy, Ernan & Stahl, Dale O. - 222-234 Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information
by Heller, Yuval & Solan, Eilon & Tomala, Tristan - 243-256 Stochastic games with information lag
by Levy, Yehuda - 257-268 The fragility of information aggregation in large elections
by Mandler, Michael - 269-284 Dynamic group formation in the repeated prisonerʼs dilemma
by Maruta, Toshimasa & Okada, Akira - 285-298 Whom do you distrust and how much does it cost? An experiment on the measurement of trust
by McEvily, Bill & Radzevick, Joseph R. & Weber, Roberto A. - 299-310 Transplant quality and patientsʼ preferences in paired kidney exchange
by Nicoló, Antonio & Rodríguez-Álvarez, Carmelo - 311-320 Equilibrium selection and the dynamic evolution of preferences
by Norman, Thomas W.L. - 321-331 On the strategic impact of an event under non-common priors
by Oyama, Daisuke & Tercieux, Olivier - 332-351 The strategic value of recall
by Peretz, Ron - 352-365 The value of information in a principal–agent model with moral hazard: The ex post contracting case
by Silvers, Randy - 366-381 Out-of-equilibrium performance of three Lindahl mechanisms: Experimental evidence
by Van Essen, Matthew & Lazzati, Natalia & Walker, Mark - 382-393 Robustness against indirect invasions
by van Veelen, Matthijs - 394-398 Group robust stability in matching markets
by Oğuz Afacan, Mustafa - 399-406 The Herodotus paradox
by Baye, Michael R. & Kovenock, Dan & de Vries, Casper G. - 407-417 Bargaining with endogenous disagreement: The extended Kalai–Smorodinsky solution
by Bozbay, Irem & Dietrich, Franz & Peters, Hans - 418-430 Ex-post stability of Bayes–Nash equilibria of large games
by Carmona, Guilherme & Podczeck, Konrad - 431-433 Linear efficient and symmetric values for TU-games: Sharing the joint gain of cooperation
by Chameni Nembua, C. - 434-441 Multiple equilibria and limit cycles in evolutionary games with Logit Dynamics
by Hommes, Cars H. & Ochea, Marius I. - 442-446 Agreeing to agree with uncountable information structures
by Xiong, Siyang
2011, Volume 73, Issue 2
- 301-309 Dominance-solvable common-value large auctions
by Azrieli, Yaron & Levin, Dan - 310-317 Uncertainty aversion and equilibrium existence in games with incomplete information
by Azrieli, Yaron & Teper, Roee - 318-344 Match-fixing under competitive odds
by Bag, Parimal Kanti & Saha, Bibhas - 345-359 Top monotonicity: A common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result
by Barberà, Salvador & Moreno, Bernardo - 360-374 Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: Towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
by Cabrales, Antonio & Serrano, Roberto - 375-387 Equilibrium rejection of a mechanism
by Celik, Gorkem & Peters, Michael - 388-401 Ex-ante licensing in sequential innovations
by Comino, Stefano & Manenti, Fabio M. & Nicolò, Antonio - 402-428 Noisy signaling: Theory and experiment
by de Haan, Thomas & Offerman, Theo & Sloof, Randolph - 429-451 Overconfidence and moral hazard
by de la Rosa, Leonidas Enrique - 452-458 Generalized Raiffa solutions
by Diskin, A. & Koppel, M. & Samet, D. - 459-478 The framing of games and the psychology of play
by Dufwenberg, Martin & Gächter, Simon & Hennig-Schmidt, Heike - 479-495 Numerical simulations of asymmetric first-price auctions
by Fibich, Gadi & Gavish, Nir - 496-506 Second best efficiency and the English auction
by Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Michelucci, Fabio - 507-516 Extreme equilibria in the negotiation model with different time preferences
by Houba, Harold & Wen, Quan - 517-537 Voronoi languages
by Jäger, Gerhard & Metzger, Lars P. & Riedel, Frank - 538-552 Investment incentives in bilateral trading
by Lau, Stephanie - 553-563 Assignment markets with the same core
by Martínez-de-Albéniz, F. Javier & Núñez, Marina & Rafels, Carles - 564-572 The optimal sorting of players in contests between groups
by Ryvkin, Dmitry - 573-594 The interaction between explicit and relational incentives: An experiment
by Sloof, Randolph & Sonnemans, Joep - 595-607 Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts
by Wolitzky, Alexander - 608-614 Sequentially rationalizable choice with transitive rationales
by Au, Pak Hung & Kawai, Keiichi - 615-621 Characterization of the Shapley–Shubik power index without the efficiency axiom
by Einy, Ezra & Haimanko, Ori
2011, Volume 73, Issue 1
- 1-16 Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: The Top Trading Absorbing Sets mechanisms
by Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Molis, Elena - 17-38 Strategic network formation through peering and service agreements
by Anshelevich, Elliot & Shepherd, F.B. & Wilfong, Gordon - 39-51 Non-cooperative solutions for estate division problems
by Atlamaz, Murat & Berden, Caroline & Peters, Hans & Vermeulen, Dries - 52-64 Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values
by Biran, Omer & Forges, Françoise