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Undominated (and) perfect equilibria in Poisson games

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  • Francesco De Sionopoli

    ()

  • Carlos Gonzalez Pimienta

    ()

Abstract

In games with population uncertainty some perfect equilibria are in dominated strategies. We prove that every Poisson game has at least one perfect equilibrium in undominated strategies.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía in its series Economics Working Papers with number we073117.

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Date of creation: Apr 2007
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Handle: RePEc:cte:werepe:we073117

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  1. Myerson, Roger B., 2000. "Large Poisson Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 7-45, September.
  2. Roger B. Myerson, 1994. "Population Uncertainty and Poisson Games," Discussion Papers 1102R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  3. Myerson, Roger B., 2002. "Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 219-251, March.
  4. Miltiadis Makris, 2006. "Complementarities and Macroeconomics: Poisson Games," Discussion Papers 0602, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
  5. Jean-François Mertens, 2004. "Ordinality in non cooperative games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 387-430, 06.
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Cited by:
  1. Laurent Bouton & Gabriele Gratton, 2013. "Majority Runoff Elections: Strategic Voting and Duverger's Hypothesis," Discussion Papers 2013-23, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
  2. Matias Nunez, 2013. "The Strategic Sincerity of Approval Voting," Post-Print hal-00917101, HAL.

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