Costly Network Formation and Regular Equilibria
We prove that for generic network-formation games where players incur some strictly positive cost to propose links the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all Nash equilibria are regular and, therefore, stable sets.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2009|
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"Generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in network-formation games,"
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- Francesco Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2005. "On the generic strategic stability of Nash equilibria if voting is costly," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 25(2), pages 477-486, February.
- Iannantuoni, Giovanna & De Sinopoli, Francesco, 2002. "On the generic strategic stability of nash equilibria if voting is costly," UC3M Working papers. Economics we025620, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
- Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2003. "On the Generic Strategic Stability of Nash Equilibria if Voting is Costly," CEIS Research Paper 41, Tor Vergata University, CEIS.
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