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Costly Network Formation and Regular Equilibria

  • Francesco De Sinopoli


    (Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Universita degli Studi di Verona)

  • Carlos Pimienta


    (School of Economics, The University of New South Wales)

We prove that for generic network-formation games where players incur some strictly positive cost to propose links the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all Nash equilibria are regular and, therefore, stable sets.

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Paper provided by School of Economics, The University of New South Wales in its series Discussion Papers with number 2009-05.

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Length: 9 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:swe:wpaper:2009-05
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  1. Francesco Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2005. "On the generic strategic stability of Nash equilibria if voting is costly," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 477-486, 02.
  2. Govindan, S & McLennan, A, 1997. "On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distributions in Game Forms," Papers 299, Minnesota - Center for Economic Research.
  3. Carlos Pimienta, 2007. "Generic Determinacy of Nash Equilibrium in Network Formation Games," Discussion Papers 2007-31, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
  4. DE SINOPOLI, Francesco, . "On the generic finiteness of equilibrium outcomes in plurality games," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1499, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  5. Antoni Calvó-Armengol & Rahmi Ilkiliç, 2005. "Pairwise-Stability and Nash Equilibria in Network Formation," Working Papers 2005.34, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  6. Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 1994. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Discussion Papers 1098, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  7. Mertens, J.-F., 1988. "Stable equilibria - a reformulation," CORE Discussion Papers 1988038, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  8. Park, I.U., 1993. "Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distribution for Sender Receiver Cheap-Talk Games," Papers 269, Minnesota - Center for Economic Research.
  9. Calvo-Armengol, Antoni, 2004. "Job contact networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 115(1), pages 191-206, March.
  10. Venkatesh Bala & Sanjeev Goyal, 2000. "A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1181-1230, September.
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