Costly Network Formation and Regular Equilibria
We prove that for generic network-formation games where players incur some strictly positive cost to propose links the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all Nash equilibria are regular and, therefore, stable sets.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2009|
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