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Generic finiteness of outcome distributions for two-person game forms with three outcomes

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  • Pimienta, Carlos

Abstract

A two-person game form is given by nonempty finite sets S1, S2 of pure strategies, a nonempty set [Omega] of outcomes, and a function [theta]:S1xS2-->[Delta]([Omega]), where [Delta]([Omega]) is the set of probability measures on [Omega]. We prove that if the set of outcomes contains just three elements, generically, there are finitely many distributions on [Omega] induced by Nash equilibria.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.

Volume (Year): 59 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
Pages: 364-365

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Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:59:y:2010:i:3:p:364-365

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565

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Keywords: Generic finiteness Game forms Nash equilibrium;

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  1. Pimienta, Carlos, 2009. "Generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in network-formation games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 920-927, July.
  2. Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert, 2001. "Direct Proofs of Generic Finiteness of Nash Equilibrium Outcomes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(3), pages 765-69, May.
  3. DEBREU, Gérard, . "Economies with a finite set of equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers RP -67, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. E. Kohlberg & J.-F. Mertens, 1998. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 445, David K. Levine.
  5. David Kreps & Robert Wilson, 1998. "Sequential Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 237, David K. Levine.
  6. Govindan, S & McLennan, A, 1997. "On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distributions in Game Forms," Papers 299, Minnesota - Center for Economic Research.
  7. Lawrence E. Blume & William R. Zame, 1993. "The Algebraic Geometry of Perfect and Sequential Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information 9309001, EconWPA.
  8. Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2002. "On The Generic Strategic Stability Of Nash Equilibria If Voting Is Costly," Economics Working Papers we025620, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
  9. Park, I.U., 1993. "Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distribution for Sender Receiver Cheap-Talk Games," Papers 269, Minnesota - Center for Economic Research.
  10. Nicolai S. Kukushkin & Cristian M. Litan & Francisco Marhuenda, 2007. "On the generic finiteness of outcome distributions for bimatrix game forms," Economics Working Papers we073520, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
  11. Andreu Mas-Colell, 2008. "Generic finiteness of equilibrium payoffs for bimatrix games," Economics Working Papers 1103, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  12. De Sinopoli, Francesco, 2001. "On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcomes in Plurality Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 270-286, February.
  13. Kukushkin, Nikolai S. & Litan, Cristian M. & Marhuenda, Francisco, 2007. "On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distributions in Bimatrix Game Forms," MPRA Paper 3325, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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Cited by:
  1. Kukushkin, Nikolai S. & Litan, Cristian M. & Marhuenda, Francisco, 2007. "On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distributions in Bimatrix Game Forms," MPRA Paper 3325, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Litan, Cristian M. & Marhuenda, Francisco, 2012. "Determinacy of equilibrium outcome distributions for zero sum and common utility games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 152-154.

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