Estimation of Finite Sequential Games
AbstractI study the estimation of finite sequential games with perfect information. The major challenge in estimation is computation of high-dimensional truncated integration whose domain is complicated by strategic interaction. I show that this complication resolves when unobserved off-the-equilibrium-path strategies are controlled for. Separately evaluating the likelihood contribution of each subgame perfect strategy profile that rationalizes the observed outcome allows the use of the GHK simulator, the most widely used importance-sampling probit simulator. Monte Carlo experiments demonstrate the performance and robustness of the proposed method, and confirm that misspecification of the decision order leads to underestimation of strategic effect.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by School of Economics, The University of New South Wales in its series Discussion Papers with number 2010-22.
Length: 44 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2010
Date of revision:
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Postal: Australian School of Business Building, Sydney 2052
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Web page: http://www.economics.unsw.edu.au/
More information through EDIRC
Inference In Discrete Games; Sequential Games; Monte Carlo Integration; GHK Simulator; Subgame Perfection; Perfect Information;
Other versions of this item:
- C35 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions
- C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-02-26 (All new papers)
- NEP-ECM-2011-02-26 (Econometrics)
- NEP-GTH-2011-02-26 (Game Theory)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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201201, ARC Centre of Excellence in Population Ageing Research (CEPAR), Australian School of Business, University of New South Wales.
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- Shiko Maruyama & Meliyanni Johar, 2013. "Do Siblings Free-Ride in "Being There" for Parents?," Discussion Papers 2013-06, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
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