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Dominance Solvable Approval Voting Games

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  • Sébastien Courtin
  • Matias Nùnez

    ()
    (Universit´e de Cergy-Pontoise, THEMA, UMR CNRS 8184
    Universit´e de Cergy-Pontoise, THEMA, UMR CNRS 8184)

Abstract

This work provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the dominance solvability of approval voting games. Our conditions are very simple since they are based on the approval relation, a binary relation between the alternatives. We distinguish between two sorts of dominance solvability and prove that the most stringent one leads to the election of the set of CondorcetWinners whereas this need not be the case for the weak version.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise in its series THEMA Working Papers with number 2013-27.

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Date of creation: 2013
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Handle: RePEc:ema:worpap:2013-27

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Keywords: Approval voting; Strategic voting; Dominance-solvability; Condorcet Winner;

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  1. Dhillon, Amrita & Lockwood, Ben, 2004. "When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 55-75, January.
  2. Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira De Moura, 2012. "One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/108675, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  3. Francesco Sinopoli & Bhaskar Dutta & Jean-François Laslier, 2006. "Approval voting: three examples," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 27-38, December.
  4. Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2011. "On the superiority of approval vs plurality: a counterexample," Working Papers, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics 210, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Jun 2011.
  5. Goertz, Johanna M.M. & Maniquet, François, 2011. "On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 146(4), pages 1464-1480, July.
  6. David S. Ahny & Santiago Oliveros, 2013. "Approval Voting and Scoring Rules with Common Values," Economics Discussion Papers, University of Essex, Department of Economics 732, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
  7. Brams, S.J. & Fishburn, P.C., 2003. "Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting," Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University 03-06, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  8. Lucia Buenrostro & Amrita Dhillon & Peter Vida, 2013. "Scoring rule voting games and dominance solvability," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 329-352, February.
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Cited by:
  1. Sebastien Courtin & Matias Nunez, 2013. "A Map of Approval Voting Equilibria Outcomes," Working Papers, HAL hal-00914887, HAL.

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