Dominance Solvable Approval Voting Games
AbstractThis work provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the dominance solvability of approval voting games. Our conditions are very simple since they are based on the approval relation, a binary relation between the alternatives. We distinguish between two sorts of dominance solvability and prove that the most stringent one leads to the election of the set of CondorcetWinners whereas this need not be the case for the weak version.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise in its series THEMA Working Papers with number 2013-27.
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
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Approval voting; Strategic voting; Dominance-solvability; Condorcet Winner;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-06-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2013-06-30 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2013-06-30 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2013-06-30 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2013-06-30 (Positive Political Economics)
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