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Abstract

We present a simple voting environment where the Condorcet winner exists. Under plurality rule, the derived game has a stable set where such a candidate is elected with probability one. However, no stable set of the approval game elects the Condorcet winner with positive probability.

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File URL: http://dipeco.economia.unimib.it/repec/pdf/mibwpaper210.pdf
File Function: First version, 2011
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 210.

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Length: 7 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2011
Date of revision: Jun 2011
Handle: RePEc:mib:wpaper:210

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Related research

Keywords: Approval voting; Plurality voting; Sophisticated voting; Mertens Stability.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

• C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
• D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

• NEP-ALL-2011-07-13 (All new papers)
• NEP-CDM-2011-07-13 (Collective Decision-Making)
• NEP-GTH-2011-07-13 (Game Theory)
• NEP-MIC-2011-07-13 (Microeconomics)
• NEP-POL-2011-07-13 (Positive Political Economics)

References

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1. Francesco De Sinopoli, 2000. "Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 655-672.
2. MERTENS, Jean-François, 1990. "The "small worlds" axiom for stable equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers 1990007, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
   
   • Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1992. "The small worlds axiom for stable equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 553-564, October.
3. DHILLON, Amrita & MERTENS, Jean-François, 1993. "Relative Utilitarianism," CORE Discussion Papers 1993048, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
   
   • Amrita Dhillon & Jean-Francois Mertens, 1999. "Relative Utilitarianism," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(3), pages 471-498, May.
4. Francesco Sinopoli & Bhaskar Dutta & Jean-François Laslier, 2006. "Approval voting: three examples," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 27-38, December.
5. Fishburn, Peter C., 1978. "Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 180-185, October.
6. Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 1982. "Persistent Equilibria in Strategic Games," Discussion Papers 515, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
7. E. Kohlberg & J.-F. Mertens, 1998. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 445, David K. Levine.
   
   • Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-37, September.

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