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On the superiority of approval vs plurality: a counterexample

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Author Info

  • Francesco De Sinopoli
  • Giovanna Iannantuoni

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Abstract

We present a simple voting environment where the Condorcet winner exists. Under plurality rule, the derived game has a stable set where such a candidate is elected with probability one. However, no stable set of the approval game elects the Condorcet winner with positive probability.

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File URL: http://dipeco.economia.unimib.it/repec/pdf/mibwpaper210.pdf
File Function: First version, 2011
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 210.

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Length: 7 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2011
Date of revision: Jun 2011
Handle: RePEc:mib:wpaper:210

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Related research

Keywords: Approval voting; Plurality voting; Sophisticated voting; Mertens Stability.;

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References

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  1. DE SINOPOLI, Francesco, . "Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1467, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. E. Kohlberg & J.-F. Mertens, 1998. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 445, David K. Levine.
  3. DHILLON, Amrita & MERTENS, Jean-François, 1993. "Relative Utilitarianism," CORE Discussion Papers 1993048, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. MERTENS, Jean-François, . "The small worlds axiom for stable equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1015, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  5. Francesco Sinopoli & Bhaskar Dutta & Jean-François Laslier, 2006. "Approval voting: three examples," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 27-38, December.
  6. Fishburn, Peter C., 1978. "Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 180-185, October.
  7. Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 1982. "Persistent Equilibria in Strategic Games," Discussion Papers 515, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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Cited by:
  1. Sébastien Courtin & Matias Nùnez, 2013. "Dominance Solvable Approval Voting Games," THEMA Working Papers 2013-27, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  2. Sébastien Courtin & Matias Nunez, 2013. "A Map of Approval Voting Equilibria Outcomes," THEMA Working Papers 2013-31, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.

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