Variable-population voting rules
AbstractLet X be a set of social alternatives, and let V be a set of `votes' or `signals'. (We do not assume any structure on X or V). A `variable population voting rule' F takes any number of anonymous votes drawn from V as input, and produces a nonempty subset of X as output. The rule F satisfies `reinforcement' if, whenever two disjoint sets of voters independently select some subset Y of X, the union of these two sets will also select Y. We show that F satisfies reinforcement if and only if F is a `balance rule'. If F satisfies a form of neutrality, then F is satisfies reinforcement if and only if F is a scoring rule (with scores taking values in an abstract linearly ordered abelian group R); this generalizes a result of Myerson (1995). We also discuss the sense in which the balance or scoring representation of F is unique. Finally, we provide a characterization of two scoring rules: `formally utilitarian' voting and `range voting'. a
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 31896.
Date of creation: 28 Jun 2011
Date of revision:
reinforcement; scoring rule; balance rule; linearly ordered abelian group; formal utilitarian; range voting;
Other versions of this item:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-07-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2011-07-13 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-MIC-2011-07-13 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2011-07-13 (Positive Political Economics)
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