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Relative Utilitarianism

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Author Info
Amrita Dhillon
Jean-Francois Mertens

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Abstract

In a framework of preferences over lotteries, the authors show that an axiom system consisting of weakened versions of Arrow's axioms has a unique solution, 'relative utilitarianism.' This consists of first normalizing individual von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities between zero and one and then summing them. The weakening consists chiefly in removing from IIA the requirement that social preferences be insensitive to variations in the intensity of preferences. The authors also show the resulting axiom system to be in a strong sense independent.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 67 (1999)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
Pages: 471-498
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:67:y:1999:i:3:p:471-498

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  1. Pivato, Marcus, 2007. "Twofold Optimality of the Relative Utilitarian Bargaining Solution," MPRA Paper 2637, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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  2. David Heyd & Uzi Segal, 2006. "Democratically Elected Aristocracies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 103-127, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Anne van den Nouweland & Myrna H. Wooders, 2005. "Status Equilibrium for Local Public Good Economies," Working Papers 0523, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
  4. Joel Sobel, 1998. "Manipulation of Preferences and Relative Utilitarianism," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 1998-17, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
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  5. MERTENS, Jean-Franois & RUBINCHIK, Anna, 2006. "Intergenerational equity and the discount rate for cost-benefit analysis," CORE Discussion Papers 2006091, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
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  6. Anne van den Nouweland & Myrna H. Wooders, 2005. "Status Equilibrium in Local Public Good Economies," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2005-14, University of Oregon Economics Department, revised 01 May 2008. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Eiichi Miyagawa, 2002. "Subgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions," Discussion Papers 0102-16, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Uzi Segal & Joel Sobel, 2001. "Min, Max, and Sum," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 512, Boston College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Pivato, Marcus, 2007. "A non-monetary form of Clarke pivotal voting," MPRA Paper 3964, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  10. Thibault Gajdos & Feriel Kandil, 2008. "The ignorant observer," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 193-232, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Manel Baucells & Lloyd S. Shapley, 2000. "Multiperson Utility," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0078, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  12. Egbert Dierker & Hildegard Dierker & Birgit Grodal, 2002. "Are Incomlete Markets Able to Achieve Minimal Efficiency?," Vienna Economics Papers 0212, University of Vienna, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  13. Aki Lehtinen, 2007. "The Borda rule is also intended for dishonest men," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(1), pages 73-90, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Pivato, Marcus, 2006. "Approximate implementation of Relative Utilitarianism via Groves-Clarke pivotal voting with virtual money," MPRA Paper 627, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  15. Egbert Dierker & Hildegard Dierker & Birgit Grodal, 2001. "Small Income Effects Destroy the Constrained Efficiency of All Equilibria in Finance Economies with Production," Discussion Papers 01-11, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  16. Attila Ambrus & Kareen Rozen, 2008. "Revealed Conflicting Preferences," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002161, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  17. Attila Ambrus & Kareen Rozen, 2008. "Rationalizing Choice with Multi-Self Models," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1670, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised Oct 2009. [Downloadable!]
  18. Egbert Dierker & Hildegard Dierker & Birgit Grodal, 2002. "Are Incomplete Markets Able to Achieve Minimal Efficiency?," Discussion Papers 03-09, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  19. dÕASPREMONT, Claude & GEVERS, Louis, 2001. "Social welfare functionals and interpersonal comparability," CORE Discussion Papers 2001040, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
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  20. Juan Moreno-Ternero & John E. Roemer, 2004. "Impartiality and Priority. Part 1: The Veil of Ignorance," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1477A, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised May 2005. [Downloadable!]
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