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A Characterization of the Plurality Rule

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  • Yohei Sekiguchi

    (Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo)

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    Abstract

    We consider an axiomatic characterization of the plurality rule, which selects the alternative(s) most preferred by the largest number of individuals. We strengthen the characterization result of Yeh (Economic Theory 34: 575{583, 2008) by replacing effciency axiom by the weaker axiom called faithfulness . Formally, we show that the plurality rule is the only rule satisfying anonymity, neutrality, reinforcement, tops-only , and faithfulness .

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    File URL: http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2012/2012cf833.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo in its series CIRJE F-Series with number CIRJE-F-833.

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    Length: 6 pages
    Date of creation: Jan 2012
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:tky:fseres:2012cf833

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    1. Semih Koray, 2000. "Self-Selective Social Choice Functions Verify Arrow and Gibbarad- Satterthwaite Theorems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(4), pages 981-996, July.
    2. Salvador Barbera & Hugo Sonnenschein & Lin Zhou, 1990. "Voting by Committees," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 941, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    3. Ching, Stephen, 1996. "A Simple Characterization of Plurality Rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 298-302, October.
    4. H. Reiju Mihara, 1996. "Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives," Public Economics 9604003, EconWPA, revised 24 Apr 1996.
    5. Barbera, S. & Sonnenschein, H., 1988. "Voting By Quota And Committee," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 95-88, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    6. Fine, B & Fine, K, 1974. "Social Choice and Individual Ranking I," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(3), pages 303-22, July.
    7. Young, H. P., 1974. "An axiomatization of Borda's rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 43-52, September.
    8. Fine, B & Fine, K, 1974. "Social Choice and Individual Rankings II," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(4), pages 459-75, October.
    9. H. Moulin, 1980. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 437-455, January.
    10. Smith, John H, 1973. "Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 1027-41, November.
    11. Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2004. "A maximal domain of preferences for strategy-proof, efficient, and simple rules in the division problem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 187-206, October.
    12. Chun-Hsien Yeh, 2008. "An efficiency characterization of plurality rule in collective choice problems," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 575-583, March.
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