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Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives

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Author Info
H. Reiju Mihara (Kagawa University)

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Abstract

In a framework allowing infinitely many individuals, I prove that coalitionally strategyproof social choice functions satisfy gtops only.h That is, they depend only on which alternative each individual prefers the most, not on which alternative she prefers the second most, the third, . . . , or the least. The functions are defined on the domain of profiles measurable with respect to a Boolean algebra of coalitions. The unrestricted domain of profiles is an example of such a domain. I also prove an extension theorem.

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Public Economics with number 9604003.

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Date of creation: 24 Apr 1996
Date of revision: 24 Apr 1996
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:9604003

Note: Social Choice and Welfare (2000) 17: 393|402
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Related research
Keywords: Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem; dominant strategy implementation; social choice functions; infinitely large societies; tops only;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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  1. Barbera Salvador & Gul Faruk & Stacchetti Ennio, 1993. "Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 262-289, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Barbera, Salvador & Sonnenschein, Hugo & Zhou, Lin, 1991. "Voting by Committees," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 595-609, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Kumabe, Masahiro & Mihara, H. Reiju, 2008. "Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: The core without majority dissatisfaction," MPRA Paper 11728, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  2. Chun-Hsien Yeh, 2008. "An efficiency characterization of plurality rule in collective choice problems," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 575-583, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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