Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives
AbstractIn a framework allowing infinitely many individuals, I prove that coalitionally strategyproof social choice functions satisfy gtops only.h That is, they depend only on which alternative each individual prefers the most, not on which alternative she prefers the second most, the third, . . . , or the least. The functions are defined on the domain of profiles measurable with respect to a Boolean algebra of coalitions. The unrestricted domain of profiles is an example of such a domain. I also prove an extension theorem.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by EconWPA in its series Public Economics with number 9604003.
Date of creation: 24 Apr 1996
Date of revision: 24 Apr 1996
Note: Social Choice and Welfare (2000) 17: 393|402
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Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem; dominant strategy implementation; social choice functions; infinitely large societies; tops only;
Other versions of this item:
- H. Reiju Mihara, 2000. "Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 393-402.
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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