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Priorities in the Location of Multiple Public Facilities

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  • BOCHET, Olivier
  • GORDON, Sidartha

Abstract

A collective decision problem is described by a set of agents, a profile of single-peaked preferences over the real line and a number k of public facilities to be located. We consider public facilities that do not su¤er from congestion and are non-excludable. We provide a characterization of the class of rules satisfying Pareto-efficiency, object-population monotonicity and sovereignty. Each rule in the class is a priority rule that selects locations according to a predetermined priority ordering among interest groups. We characterize each of the subclasses of priority rules that respectively satisfy anonymity, hiding-proofness and strategy-proofness. In particular, we prove that a priority rule is strategy-proof if and only if it partitions the set of agents into a fixed hierarchy. Alternatively, any such rule can be viewed as a collection of fixed-populations generalized peak-selection median rules (Moulin, 1980), that are linked across populations, in a way that we describe.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 07-2008.

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Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mtl:montec:07-2008

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Keywords: Multiple public facilities; Priority rules; Hierarchical rules; Object-population-monotonicity; Sovereignty; Anonymity; Strategy-proofness; Generalized median rules; Hiding-proofness.;

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References

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  1. Moulin, Herve, 1987. "The Pure Compensation Problem: Egalitarianism versus Laissez-Fairism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(4), pages 769-83, November.
  2. Vohra, Rakesh V., 1999. "The replacement principle and tree structured preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 175-180, May.
  3. Gordon, Sidartha, 2007. "Public decisions: Solidarity and the status quo," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 225-241, November.
  4. Biung-Ghi Ju, 2005. "Efficiency and Consistency for Locating Multiple Public Facilities," WORKING PAPERS SERIES IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ECONOMICS 200507, University of Kansas, Department of Economics, revised Feb 2005.
  5. Bettina Klaus, 2001. "Target Rules for Public Choice Economies on Tree Networks and in Euclidean Spaces," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 13-29, August.
  6. Anna Bogomolnaia & Antonio Nicolo, 2005. "Stable Assignment of Public Facilities under Congestion," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 7(1), pages 65-91, 02.
  7. Barbera, Salvador & Sonnenschein, Hugo & Zhou, Lin, 1991. "Voting by Committees," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 595-609, May.
  8. William Thomson, 1999. "Welfare-domination under preference-replacement: A survey and open questions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 373-394.
  9. Ching, S. & Thomson, W., 1993. "Population-Monotonic Solutions in Public Good Economies with Single- Peaked Preferences," RCER Working Papers 362, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  10. Jackson, Matthew O. & Nicolo, Antonio, 2002. "The Strategy-Proof Provision of Public Goods Under Congestion and Crowding Preferences," Working Papers 1148, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  11. Olivier Bochet & Sidartha Gordon, 2008. "Priorities in the Location of Multiple Public Facilities," Diskussionsschriften dp0902, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
  12. Ehlers, Lars, 2003. "Multiple public goods, lexicographic preferences, and single-plateaued preference rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 1-27, April.
  13. H. Moulin, 1980. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 437-455, January.
  14. Sidartha Gordon, 2007. "Solidarity in choosing a location on a cycle," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 125-147, July.
  15. David Cantala, 2004. "Choosing the level of a public good when agents have an outside option," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 491-514, 06.
  16. Thomson, William, 1993. "The replacement principle in public good economies with single-peaked preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 31-36.
  17. Barbera, Salvador & Bevia, Carmen, 2002. "Self-Selection Consistent Functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 263-277, August.
  18. Ehlers, L., 2001. "Multiple Public Goods and Lexicographic Preferences Replacement Principle," Cahiers de recherche 2001-25, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  19. Moulin, Herve, 1988. "Condorcet's principle implies the no show paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 53-64, June.
  20. Eiichi Miyagawa, 2001. "Locating libraries on a street," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 527-541.
  21. Smith, John H, 1973. "Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 1027-41, November.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Bochet, Olivier & Gordon, Sidartha, 2012. "Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 52-67.
  2. Eun Heo, 2013. "Strategy-proof rules for two public goods: double median rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 41(4), pages 895-922, October.
  3. Bochet, Olivier & Gordon, Sidartha & Saran, Rene, 2013. "Weighted majoritarian rules for the location of multiple public facilities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 454-459.
  4. Masashi Umezawa, 2012. "The replacement principle for the provision of multiple public goods on tree networks," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 211-235, February.

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