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On the Determinant of Economic Growth

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  • Rebelo, S.

Abstract

This paper reports on the progress made by the literature about economic growth in answering the question "Why do Growth Rates Differ? " It reviews that we currently know about the mechanics of growth miracles and poverty traps, as well as the tentative policy advice that these mechanics suggest.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER) in its series RCER Working Papers with number 443.

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Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:roc:rocher:443

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Postal: University of Rochester, Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, Harkness 231 Rochester, New York 14627 U.S.A.

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Keywords: ECONOMIC GROWTH ; INNOVATIONS ; HUMAN CAPITAL;

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References

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Cited by:
  1. Charles Ka-Yui Leung & Sam Hak Kan Tang & Nicolaas Groenewold, 2005. "Growth volatility and technical progress: a simple rent-seeking model," Departmental Working Papers, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Department of Economics _174, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Department of Economics.

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