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Springer Review of Economic Design Contact information of
Springer: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/10058/index.htm
Order information: http://link.springer.de/orders.htm
Download restrictions: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted. Editor: Atila Abdulkadiroglu Editor:
For technical questions regarding this series, please contact
(Christopher F Baum) Series handle: repec:spr:reecde
More pages of listings: 0 |1 2009, Volume 13, Issue 4
2009, Volume 13, Issue 3 2009, Volume 13, Issue 1 2008, Volume 12, Issue 4 2008, Volume 12, Issue 3 2008, Volume 12, Issue 2 2008, Volume 12, Issue 1 2008, Volume 11, Issue 4 2007, Volume 11, Issue 3 2007, Volume 11, Issue 2 2007, Volume 11, Issue 1 2007, Volume 10, Issue 4 2006, Volume 10, Issue 3 2006, Volume 10, Issue 2 2006, Volume 10, Issue 1 2005, Volume 9, Issue 4 2005, Volume 9, Issue 3 2005, Volume 9, Issue 2 2004, Volume 9, Issue 1 2004, Volume 8, Issue 4 2003, Volume 8, Issue 3 2003, Volume 8, Issue 2 2003, Volume 8, Issue 1 2002, Volume 7, Issue 2 2002, Volume 7, Issue 1 1-15 A study of proportionality and robustness in economies with a commonly owned technology by François Maniquet [Downloadable! (restricted)]
17-26 The not-so-secret-agent: Professional monitors, hierarchies and implementation by Sandeep Baliga [Downloadable! (restricted)]
27-43 Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory by Walter Trockel [Downloadable! (restricted)]
45-56 How to get firms to invest: A simple solution to the hold-up problem in regulation by Hans Gersbach [Downloadable! (restricted)]
57-73 Can we identify Walrasian allocations? by Antonio Manresa [Downloadable! (restricted)]
75-91 Achieving the first best in sequencing problems by Manipushpak Mitra [Downloadable! (restricted)]
93-104 Non-manipulability in Walrasian cost games Marta Faias (1), Emma Moreno-García (1)(2), Mário Rui Páscoa (2) (1) Faculdade de Economia, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Travessa Estevao Pinto, 1099-032 Lisboa, Portugal (e-mail: mcm@mail.fct.unl.pt; pascoa@fe.unl.pt) (2) Departamento de Economía e Historia Económica, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad de Salamanca, Edificio F.E.S., Campus Miguel de Unamuno, 37008 Salamanca, Spain (e-mail: emmam@usal.es) Received: 24 December 1999 / Accepted: 18 October 2001 JEL classification: D41, D51 Key words: Perfect competition, monopolistic power, Walrasian equilibrium, thick markets by Mário Rui Páscoa & Emma Moreno-García & Marta Faias [Downloadable! (restricted)]
105-115 Strategy-proof allocation when preferences are single-plateaued by Lars Ehlers [Downloadable! (restricted)]
2001, Volume 6, Issue 3 2001, Volume 6, Issue 2 2001, Volume 6, Issue 1 2000, Volume 5, Issue 4 2000, Volume 5, Issue 3 2000, Volume 5, Issue 2 2000, Volume 5, Issue 1 1999, Volume 4, Issue 4 1999, Volume 4, Issue 3 1999, Volume 4, Issue 2 1999, Volume 4, Issue 1 0 |1 Access
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.
IDEAS at the Department of Economics , College of Liberal Arts and Sciences , University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics .