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Solidarity in Choosing a Location on a Cycle

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Author Info
GORDON, Sidartha
Abstract

We study the implications of two solidarity conditions on the efficient location of a public good on a cycle, when agents have single-peaked, symmetric preferences. Both conditions require that when circumstances change, the agents not responsible for the change should all be affected in the same direction: either they all gain or they all loose. The first condition, population-monotonicity, applies to arrival or departure of one agent. The second, replacement-domination, applies to changes in the preferences of one agent. Unfortunately, no Pareto-efficient solution satisfies any of these properties. However, if agents’ preferred points are restricted to the vertices of a small regular polygon inscribed in the circle, solutions exist. We characterize them as a class of efficient priority rules.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 2006-06.

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Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: 2006
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Handle: RePEc:mtl:montde:2006-06

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Related research
Keywords: Location Theory ; Cycle ; Efficiency; Polation-monotonicity; Reacement-Domination; Single-Peaked;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. William Thomson, 1999. "Welfare-domination under preference-replacement: A survey and open questions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 373-394. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Thomson, William, 1983. "Problems of fair division and the Egalitarian solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 211-226, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. GORDON, Sidartha, 2006. "Public Decisions: Solidarity and the Status Quo," Cahiers de recherche 2006-05, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques. [Downloadable!]
  4. Moulin, Herve, 1987. "The Pure Compensation Problem: Egalitarianism versus Laissez-Fairism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(4), pages 769-83, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Ehlers, Lars & Klaus, Bettina, 2001. " Solidarity and Probabilistic Target Rules," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 3(2), pages 167-84. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Eiichi Miyagawa, 2001. "Locating libraries on a street," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 527-541. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Vohra, Rakesh V., 1999. "The replacement principle and tree structured preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 175-180, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Schummer, James & Vohra, Rakesh V., 2002. "Strategy-proof Location on a Network," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(2), pages 405-428, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Ching, S. & Thomson, W., 1993. "Population-Monotonic Solutions in Public Good Economies with Single- Peaked Preferences," RCER Working Papers 362, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  10. Thomson, William, 1993. "The replacement principle in public good economies with single-peaked preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 31-36. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Ehlers, Lars, 2002. "Multiple public goods and lexicographic preferences: replacement principle," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 1-15, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. William Thomson, 2007. "Fair Allocation Rules," RCER Working Papers 539, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER). [Downloadable!]
  13. Bettina Klaus, 2001. "Target Rules for Public Choice Economies on Tree Networks and in Euclidean Spaces," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 13-29, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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