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Chapter Twenty-One - Fair Allocation Rules

In: Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare

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  • Thomson, William

Abstract

We review the theory of fairness as it pertains to concretely specified problems of resource allocations. We present punctual notions designed to evaluate how well individuals, or groups, are treated in relation to one another: no-envy, egalitarian-equivalence, individual and collective lower or upper bounds on welfare, notions of equal or equivalent opportunities, as well as various families extending these notions. We also introduce relational notions specifying how allocation rules should respond to changes in resources (resource monotonicity), technologies (technology monotonicity), preferences (welfare domination under preference replacement), and population (population monotonicity, consistency, converse consistency). We investigate the implications of these properties, in various combinations, in the context of various models: the “classical” problem of dividing an unproduced bundle, economies with production, economies with public goods, economies with single-peaked preferences, economies with indivisible goods, and economies in which the dividend is a non-homogeneous continuum. We consider economies in which resources are owned collectively, economies in which they are owned privately, and economies in which ownership is mixed. We offer a number of characterizations of particular allocation rules.

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This chapter was published in:

  • K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), 2011. "Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 2, number 2.
    This item is provided by Elsevier in its series Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare with number 2-21.

    Handle: RePEc:eee:socchp:2-21

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/bookseriesdescription.cws_home/BS_HE/description

    Related research

    Keywords: fairness; no-envy; egalitarian-equivalence; lower bounds on welfares; upper bounds on welfare; equal opportunities; equivalent opportunities; resource monotonicity; technology monotonicity; preference domination under preference replacement; population monotonicity; consistency; converse consistency; classical problem of fair division; production economies; public goods; single-peaked preferences; indivisible goods; non-homogeneous continuum;

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    Cited by:
    1. Juan D. Moreno-Ternero & John E. Roemer, 2011. "A common ground for resource and welfare egalitarianism," Working Papers 11.12, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
    2. Jens L. Hougaard & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero & Lars P. Østerdal, 2011. "A unifying framework for the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims," Working Papers 2011-03, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.

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