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Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems

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Author Info
EHLERS, Lars
KLAUS, Bettina

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Abstract

We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules satisfying efficiency and resource-monotonicity. The characterized rules assign the objects in a sequence of steps such that at each step there is either a dictator or two agents who “trade” objects from their hierarchically specified “endowments.”

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 12-2003.

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Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: 2003
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Handle: RePEc:mtl:montec:12-2003

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Related research
Keywords: Indivisible objects; resource-monotonicity;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Chun, Youngsub & Thomson, William, 1988. "Monotonicity properties of bargaining solutions when applied to economics," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 11-27, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Moulin, Herve & Thomson, William, 1988. "Can everyone benefit from growth? : Two difficulties," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 339-345, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Toru Hokari, 2000. "note: The nucleolus is not aggregate-monotonic on the domain of convex games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 133-137. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Ehlers, Lars & Klaus, Bettina & Papai, Szilvia, 2002. "Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 329-339, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Ehlers, Lars, 2002. "Coalitional Strategy-Proof House Allocation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 298-317, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sonmez, 1998. "Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 689-702, May.
  7. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Moulin, Herve, 2001. "A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 295-328, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2002. "Efficient Priority Rules," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 554.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
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  9. Haluk I. Ergin, 2002. "Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2489-2497, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. EHLERS, Lars & KLAUS, Bettina, 2005. "Consistent House Allocation," Cahiers de recherche 2005-08, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Ergin, Haluk I., 2000. "Consistency in house allocation problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 77-97, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Sonmez, Tayfun, 1999. "House Allocation with Existing Tenants," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 233-260, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Maniquet, Francois & Sprumont, Yves, 2000. "On resource monotonicity in the fair division problem," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 68(3), pages 299-302, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Onur Kesten, 2009. "Coalitional strategy-proofness and resource monotonicity for house allocation problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 17-21, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Juan Moreno-Ternero & John E. Roemer, 2004. "Impartiality and Priority. Part 2: A Characterization with Solidarity," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1477B, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised May 2005. [Downloadable!]
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