A strong incompatibility between efficiency and equity in non-convex economies
AbstractIn allocation problems of perfectly divisible goods, we study the equity property of 'no-domination', according to which no agent can receive strictly more of all goods than any other agent. We prove that no-domination is incompatible with Pareto efficiency, as soon as preferences are allowed to be non-convex.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.
Volume (Year): 32 (1999)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco
Other versions of this item:
- Maniquet, F., 1996. "A Strong Incompatibility Between Efficiency and Equity in Non-Convex Economics," RCER Working Papers 426, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
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