Children crying at birthday parties. Why? Fairness and incentives for cake division problems
AbstractWe consider the problem of dividing a non-homogeneous one- dimensional continuum whose endpoints are topologically identi¯ed. Examples are the division of a birthday cake, the partition of a circular market, the assignment of sentry duty or medical call. We study the existence of rules satisfying various requirements of fairness (no-envy, egalitarian-equivalence; and several requirements having to do with changes in the data of the problem), and that induce agents to reveal their preferences honestly (strategy-proofness).
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER) in its series RCER Working Papers with number 526.
Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2006
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Postal: University of Rochester, Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, Harkness 231 Rochester, New York 14627 U.S.A.
cake division; no-envy; strategy-proofness.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-04-22 (All new papers)
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