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A Characterization of the Shapley Value in Queueing Problems

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Author Info
Maniquet, F.

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Abstract

A set of agents stand to receive a service. No two agents can be served simultaneously. A Queue has been organized, and agents having to wait should receive monetary compensations. We characterize the rule assigning positions in the queue and compensations corresponding to the payoffs recommended by the Shapley value of the associated cooperative game.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales in its series Papers with number 222.

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Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:nodapa:222

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Related research
Keywords: GAME THEORY ; ECONOMIC MODELS;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

Cited by:
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