Cake Cutting – Fair and Square
AbstractThe classic fair cake-cutting problem [Steinhaus, 1948] is extended by introducing geometric constraints on the allocated pieces. Specifically, agents may demand to get their share as a square or a rectangle with a bounded length/width ratio. This is a plausible constraint in realistic cake-cutting applications, notably in urban and agricultural economics where the “cake” is land. Geometric constraints greatly affect the classic results of the fair division theory. The existence of a proportional division, giving each agent 1/n of his total cake value, is no longer guaranteed. We prove that it is impossible to guarantee each agent more than 1/(2n-1) of his total value. Moreover, we provide procedures implementing partially proportional division, giving each agent 1/(An-B) of his total value, where A and B are constants depending on the shape of the cake and its pieces. Fairness and social welfare implications of these procedures are analyzed in various scenarios.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University in its series Working Papers with number 2014-01.
Length: 44 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2014
Date of revision:
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Postal: Faculty of Social Sciences, Bar Ilan University 52900 Ramat-Gan
Phone: Phone: +972-3-5318345
Web page: http://econ.biu.ac.il
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fair division; cake cutting; land division; geometry; non-additive utilities; social welfare;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2014-01-24 (All new papers)
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