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Public Decisions: Solidarity and the Status Quo

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Author Info
GORDON, Sidartha
Abstract

A public decision model specifies a fixed set of alternatives A, a variable population, and a fixed set of admissible preferences over A, common to all agents. We study the implications, for any social choice function, of the principle of solidarity, in the class of all such models. The principle says that when the environment changes, all agents not responsible for the change should all be affected in the same direction: either all weakly win, or all weakly lose. We consider two formulations of this principle: population-monotonicity (Thomson, 1983); and replacement-domination (Moulin, 1987). Under weak additional requirements, but regardless of the domain of preferences considered, each of the two conditions implies (i) coalition-strategy-proofness; (ii) that the choice only depends on the set of preferences that are present in the society and not on the labels of agents, nor on the number of agents having a particular preference; (iii) that there exists a status quo point, i.e. an alternative always weakly Pareto-dominated by the alternative selected by the rule. We also prove that replacement-domination is generally at least as strong as population-monotonicity.

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Paper provided by Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 2006-05.

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Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: 2006
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Handle: RePEc:mtl:montde:2006-05

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Keywords: Polation-monotonicity; reacement-domination; solidarity; strategy-oofness; coalition-strategy-oofness; blic decision; status quo;

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Salvador Barbera & Matthew Jackson, 1991. "A Characterization of Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions for Economies with Pure Public Goods," Discussion Papers 964, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  2. William Thomson, 1999. "Welfare-domination under preference-replacement: A survey and open questions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 373-394. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Thomson, William, 1983. "Problems of fair division and the Egalitarian solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 211-226, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Moulin, Herve, 1987. "The Pure Compensation Problem: Egalitarianism versus Laissez-Fairism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(4), pages 769-83, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Ehlers, Lars & Klaus, Bettina, 2001. " Solidarity and Probabilistic Target Rules," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 3(2), pages 167-84. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Eiichi Miyagawa, 2001. "Locating libraries on a street," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 527-541. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Vohra, Rakesh V., 1999. "The replacement principle and tree structured preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 175-180, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Schummer, James & Vohra, Rakesh V., 2002. "Strategy-proof Location on a Network," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(2), pages 405-428, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Ching, S. & Thomson, W., 1993. "Population-Monotonic Solutions in Public Good Economies with Single- Peaked Preferences," RCER Working Papers 362, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  11. Ehlers, Lars & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2002. "Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Decision Schemes for One-Dimensional Single-Peaked Preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 408-434, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Thomson, William, 1993. "The replacement principle in public good economies with single-peaked preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 31-36. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Ehlers, Lars, 2002. "Multiple public goods and lexicographic preferences: replacement principle," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 1-15, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Berga, Dolors, 1998. "Strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 105-120, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. William Thomson, 2007. "Fair Allocation Rules," RCER Working Papers 539, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER). [Downloadable!]
  16. Gibbard, Allan, 1977. "Manipulation of Schemes That Mix Voting with Chance," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(3), pages 665-81, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Bettina Klaus, 2001. "Target Rules for Public Choice Economies on Tree Networks and in Euclidean Spaces," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 13-29, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. GORDON, Sidartha, 2006. "Solidarity in Choosing a Location on a Cycle," Cahiers de recherche 2006-06, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques. [Downloadable!]
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