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Abstract

We consider a probabilistic approach to collective choice problems where a group of agents with single-peaked preferences have to decide on the level or location of a public good. We show that every probabilistic rule that satisfies Pareto efficiency and "solidarity" (population-monotonicity or replacement-domination) must equal a so-called target rule. Copyright 2001 by Blackwell Publishing Inc.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Association for Public Economic Theory in its journal Journal of Public Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 3 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 167-84

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Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:3:y:2001:i:2:p:167-84

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References

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

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1. Klaus, Bettina, 2001. "Uniform allocation and reallocation revisited," Open Access publications from Maastricht University urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-20042, Maastricht University.
2. Chichilnisky, Graciela & Thomson, William, 1987. "The walrasian mechanism from equal division is not monotonic with respect to variations in the number of consumers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 119-124, February.
3. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sonmez, 1998. "Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 689-702, May.
4. Thomson, W., 1992. "The Replacement Principle in Public Good Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences," RCER Working Papers 340, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
   
   • Thomson, William, 1993. "The replacement principle in public good economies with single-peaked preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 31-36.
5. Samuelson, William & Zeckhauser, Richard, 1988. " Status Quo Bias in Decision Making," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 7-59, March.
6. William Thomson, 1999. "Welfare-domination under preference-replacement: A survey and open questions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 373-394.
7. Sprumont, Yves & Zhou, Lin, 1999. "Pazner-Schmeidler rules in large societies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 321-339, April.
8. Lars Ehlers, 2002. "Probabilistic allocation rules and single-dipped preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 325-348.
9. Ehlers, Lars & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2002. "Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences," Open Access publications from Maastricht University urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-12239, Maastricht University.
   
   • Ehlers, Lars & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2002. "Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Decision Schemes for One-Dimensional Single-Peaked Preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 408-434, August.
10. Sprumont, Yves, 1990. "Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 378-394, December.

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Citations

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Cited by:

1. GORDON, Sidartha, 2006. "Solidarity in Choosing a Location on a Cycle," Cahiers de recherche 2006-06, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
   
   • Sidartha Gordon, 2007. "Solidarity in choosing a location on a cycle," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 125-147, July.
   • GORDON, Sidartha, 2006. "Solidarity in Choosing a Location on a Cycle," Cahiers de recherche 17-2006, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
2. MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D. & ROEMER, John E., 2005. "Impartiality, priority, and solidarity in the theory of justice," CORE Discussion Papers 2005077, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
   
   • Juan D Moreno-Ternero & John E Roemer, 2006. "Impartiality, Priority, and Solidarity in the Theory of Justice," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(5), pages 1419-1427, 09.
3. Juan Moreno-Ternero & John E. Roemer, 2004. "Impartiality and Priority. Part 2: A Characterization with Solidarity," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1477B, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised May 2005.
4. Ehlers, L., 2001. "Multiple Public Goods and Lexicographic Preferences Replacement Principle," Cahiers de recherche 2001-25, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
   
   • Ehlers, Lars, 2002. "Multiple public goods and lexicographic preferences: replacement principle," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 1-15, February.
   • EHLERS, Lars, 2001. "Multiple Public Goods and Lexicographic Preferences Replacement Principle," Cahiers de recherche 2001-25, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
5. EHLERS, Lars & KLAUS, Bettina, 2001. "Probabilistic Assignments of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules," Cahiers de recherche 2001-27, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
   
   • Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2003. "Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 249-268, October.
   • Ehlers, L. & Klaus, B., 2001. "Probabilistic Assignements of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules," Cahiers de recherche 2001-27, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
   • Ehlers, Lars & Klaus, Bettina, 2003. "Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules," Open Access publications from Maastricht University urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-20036, Maastricht University.
6. Klaus, Bettina, 2001. "Target rules for public choice economies on tree networks and in euclidean spaces," Open Access publications from Maastricht University urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-20046, Maastricht University.
   
   • Bettina Klaus, 2001. "Target Rules for Public Choice Economies on Tree Networks and in Euclidean Spaces," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 13-29, August.
7. GORDON, Sidartha, 2006. "Public Decisions: Solidarity and the Status Quo," Cahiers de recherche 16-2006, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
   
   • Gordon, Sidartha, 2007. "Public decisions: Solidarity and the status quo," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 225-241, November.
   • GORDON, Sidartha, 2006. "Public Decisions: Solidarity and the Status Quo," Cahiers de recherche 2006-05, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.

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