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Solidarity in Terms of Reciprocity

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Abstract

In this paper we introduce a new concept of solidarity in terms of reciprocity and characterize the set of social choice functions that are reciprocate (in both a strong and a weak sense), anonymous and efficient in a standard public good provision model when the agents have single-peaked preferences on the amount of the good provided. The resulting procedures are the well-known Generalized Condorcet Winner Solutions, and therefore, we provide an alternative characterization of that class of social choice functions based in new ethical properties regarding solidarity.

Suggested Citation

  • Juan Perote Peña, 2003. "Solidarity in Terms of Reciprocity," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2003/16, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
    • Handle: RePEc:cea:doctra:e2003_16
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Single-peaked preferences; solidarity; welfare domination under preference replacement.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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