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Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules

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Author Info
Salvador Barbera

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Abstract

We consider the problem of alloting shares of a task or good among agents with single peaked preferences over their own shares. Previous characterizations have examined rules, such as the uniform rule, which satisfy various symmetry requirements. We consider the case where agents might begin with natural claims to minimal or maximal allotments, or might be treated with different priorities. We provide characterizations of the rules which are strategy-proof and efficient, but may treat individuals asymmetrically.

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File URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1142.pdf
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Paper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 1142.

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Date of creation: Sep 1995
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Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1142

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Thomson, William, 1997. "The Replacement Principle in Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 145-168, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Salvador Barbera & Matthew Jackson, 1991. "A Characterization of Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions for Economies with Pure Public Goods," Discussion Papers 964, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  3. Satterthwaite, Mark A & Sonnenschein, Hugo, 1981. "Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 48(4), pages 587-97, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Jackson, Matthew O, 1992. "Implementation in Undominated.Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 59(4), pages 757-75, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Moulin, H & Thomson, W, 1995. "Axiomatic Analysis of Resource Allocation," RCER Working Papers 400, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  6. Salvador Barbera & Matthew O. Jackson, 1993. "Strategy-Proof Exchange," Discussion Papers 1021, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Moulin, Herve, 1985. "Egalitarianism and Utilitarianism in Quasi-linear Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(1), pages 49-67, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Moulin, Herve, 1985. "The separability axiom and equal-sharing methods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 120-148, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Ehud Kalai, 1977. "Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons," Discussion Papers 179, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Klaus,Bettina & Peters,Hans & Storcken,Ton, 1995. "Strategy-proof division with single-peaked preferences and initial endowments," Research Memoranda 001, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  11. Thomson William, 1994. "Consistent Solutions to the Problem of Fair Division When Preferences Are Single-Peaked," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 219-245, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Roemer, John E, 1986. "Equality of Resources Implies Equality of Welfare," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(4), pages 751-84, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Aumann, Robert J. & Maschler, Michael, 1985. "Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-213, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Dasgupta, Partha S & Hammond, Peter J & Maskin, Eric S, 1979. "The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 46(2), pages 185-216, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Sonmez, Tayfun, 1994. "Consistency, monotonicity, and the uniform rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 229-235, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Moulin, Herve, 2001. "Axiomatic Cost and Surplis-Sharing," Working Papers 2001-06, Rice University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Özgür Kıbrıs & Serkan Küçükşenel, 2009. "Uniform trade rules for uncleared markets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 101-121, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Hideki Mizukami & Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Takuma Wakayama, 2003. "Strategy-proof Sharing," Discussion papers 03017, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Jordi MassóAuthor-Email: jordi.masso@uab.es & Alejandro Neme, 2002. "A Maximal Domain of Preferences for Tops-only Rules in the Division Problem," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 535.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
  5. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez, 2006. "Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001022, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Matthew O. Jackson & Antonio Nicolo, 2002. "The Strategy-Proof Provision of Public Goods under Congestion and Crowding Preferences," Microeconomics 0211005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Klaus,B. & Peters,H. & Storcken,T., 1995. "Reallocation of an infinetely divisible good," Research Memoranda 012, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Jordi MassóAuthor-Email: jordi.masso@uab.es & Alejandro Neme, 2003. "Bribe-proof Rules in the Division Problem," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 571.03, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Kentaro Hatsumi & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2009. "Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 423-447, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Carmen Herrero & Ricardo Martinez, 2006. "Allocation problems with indivisibilities when preferences are single-peaked," Working Papers 06.29, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Birner,Jack, 1995. "Is the past really what is used to be ?," Research Memoranda 021, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  12. Anirban Kar & Özgür Kıbrıs, 2008. "Allocating multiple estates among agents with single-peaked preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 31(4), pages 641-666, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Moulin, Herve & Stong, Richard, 2001. "Fair Queuing and Other Probabilistic Allocation Methods," Working Papers 2000-09, Rice University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  14. Pablo Amorós, 1998. "- Single-Peaked Preferences With Several Commodities," Working Papers. Serie AD 1998-23, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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