We consider the problem of alloting shares of a task or good among agents with single peaked preferences over their own shares. Previous characterizations have examined rules, such as the uniform rule, which satisfy various symmetry requirements. We consider the case where agents might begin with natural claims to minimal or maximal allotments, or might be treated with different priorities. We provide characterizations of the rules which are strategy-proof and efficient, but may treat individuals asymmetrically.
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Paper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number
1142.
Length: Date of creation: Sep 1995 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1142
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Salvador Barbera & Matthew O. Jackson, 1993.
"Strategy-Proof Exchange,"
Discussion Papers
1021, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Barbera, Salvador & Jackson, Matthew O, 1995.
"Strategy-Proof Exchange,"
Econometrica,
Econometric Society, vol. 63(1), pages 51-87, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Hideki Mizukami & Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Takuma Wakayama, 2003.
"Strategy-proof Sharing,"
Discussion papers
03017, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
[Downloadable!]
Mizukami, Hideki & Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Wakayama, Takuma, 2003.
"Strategy-Proof Sharing,"
Working Papers
1170, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
[Downloadable!]