We consider the problem of allocating a single infinitely divisible commodity to agents with single-peaked preferences, and establish two properties of the rule that has played the central role in the analysis of this problem, the uniform role. Among the efficient allocations, it selects (1) the one at which the difference between the largest amount received by any agent and the smallest sush amount is minimal, and (2) the one at which the variance of the amounts received by the agents is minimal.
Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page
whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be
available.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER) in its series RCER Working Papers with number
423.
Length: 11 pages Date of creation: 1996 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:roc:rocher:423
Contact details of provider: Postal: UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER, CENTER FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, HARKNESS 231 ROCHESTER NEW YORK 14627 U.S.A.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Terry Fisher).
Find related papers by JEL classification: D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)