This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

- Single-Peaked Preferences With Several Commodities

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Pablo Amorós (Universidad de Alicante)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We consider the problem of allocating m(m>=2) infinitely divisible commodities among agents with single-peaked preferences. In the two-agents case any strategy-proof and efficient solution is dictatorial. First, we propose a solution that, in the two-agents case, is the only one that satisfies strategy-proofness, no-envy and a weak requirement related to efficiency. Moreover, it is implementable in dominant strategies and satisfies consistency properties. Second, we propose an extension of the Mas-Colells Walrasian equilibrium with slack to characterize the efficient allocations.This new solution allow us to associate with each efficient allocation an income redistribution necessary to obtain it. We prove that the original solution proposed by Mas-Colell is the efficient selection which requires an income redistribution with smallest range, and that it satisfies consistency properties.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-1998-23.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: Fisrt version / Primera version, 1998
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) in its series Working Papers. Serie AD with number 1998-23.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: Oct 1998
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published by Ivie
Handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasad:1998-23

Contact details of provider:
Postal: C/ Guardia Civil, 22, Esc 2a, 1o, E-46020 VALENCIA
Phone: +34 96 319 00 50
Fax: +34 96 319 00 55
Email:
Web page: http://www.ivie.es/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Departamento de Edición).

Related research
Keywords: consistency single-peaked preferences strategy-proofness

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Thomson William, 1994. "Consistent Solutions to the Problem of Fair Division When Preferences Are Single-Peaked," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 219-245, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Satterthwaite, Mark A & Sonnenschein, Hugo, 1981. "Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 48(4), pages 587-97, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. James Schummer, 1996. "Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 47-56. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Thomson, William, 1995. "Population-Monotonic Solutions to the Problem of Fair Division When Preferences Are Single-Peaked," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 229-46, March.
    Other versions:
  5. Dagan, Nir, 1996. "A Note on Thomson's Characterizations of the Uniform Rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 255-261, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Lin Zhou, 1990. "Inefficiency of Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms in Pure Exchange Economies," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 954, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  7. Thomson, W., 1991. "Resource-Monotonic Solutions to the Problem of Fair Divosion when Preferences are Single-Peaked ," RCER Working Papers 301, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  8. Masso, J. & Barbera, S., 1996. "Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges," ASSET - Instituto De Economia Publica 156, ASSET (Association of Southern European Economic Theorists).
    Other versions:
  9. Schummer, James & Thomson, William, 1997. "Two derivations of the uniform rule and an application to bankruptcy," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 333-337, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Salvador Barbera, 1995. "Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules," Discussion Papers 1142, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Barbera, Salvador & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 1997. "Voting under Constraints," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 298-321, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Barbera, S. & Gul, F. & Stacchetti, E., 1992. "Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 184.92, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    Other versions:
  13. Ching, Stephen, 1992. "A simple characterization of the uniform rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 57-60, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Zhou, Lin, 1991. "Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 58(1), pages 107-19, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? About 2000 working paper series are listed on RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2008-8-10.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.