Two derivations of the uniform rule and an application to bankruptcy
AbstractWe consider the problem of allocating a single infinitely divisible commodity to agents with single-peaked preferences, and establish two properties of the rule that has played the central role in the analysis of this problem, the uniform role. Among the efficient allocations, it selects (1) the one at which the difference between the largest amount received by any agent and the smallest sush amount is minimal, and (2) the one at which the variance of the amounts received by the agents is minimal.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 55 (1997)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Other versions of this item:
- Schummer, J. & Thomson, W., 1996. "Two Derivations of the Uniform Rule and an Application to Bankruptcy," RCER Working Papers 423, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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