Consistency and the Walrasian Allocations Correspondence
AbstractWe characterize the Walrasian allocations correspondence by means of consistency requirements and other axioms. We present two characterization results; both require consistency, converse consistency and standard axioms. One of them requires the allocations to be envy free (with respect to trades) and the other--stable with respect to bilateral recontracting. The characterizations hold in classes of exchange economies with smooth and convex preferences, and also on domains with a finite number of potential agents.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Nir Dagan in its series Economic theory and game theory with number 012.
Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: Jan 1996
Date of revision:
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Postal: Nir Dagan, Dept. of Economics and Management, Tel-Hai Academic College, Upper Galilee, Israel.
Web page: http://www.nirdagan.com/research/
Other versions of this item:
- Nir Dagan, 1996. "Consistency and the Walrasian allocations correspondence," Economics Working Papers 151, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- NEP-ALL-1998-09-14 (All new papers)
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