Consistency and the Walrasian Allocations Correspondence

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Consistency and the Walrasian Allocations Correspondence

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Nir Dagan

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Nir Dagan

Abstract

We characterize the Walrasian allocations correspondence by means of consistency requirements and other axioms. We present two characterization results; both require consistency, converse consistency and standard axioms. One of them requires the allocations to be envy free (with respect to trades) and the other--stable with respect to bilateral recontracting. The characterizations hold in classes of exchange economies with smooth and convex preferences, and also on domains with a finite number of potential agents.

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Paper provided by Nir Dagan in its series Economic theory and game theory with number 012.

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Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: Jan 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nid:ndagan:012

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Postal: Nir Dagan, Dept. of Economics and Management, Tel-Hai Academic College, Upper Galilee, Israel.
Web page: http://www.nirdagan.com/research/

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Paper
- Nir Dagan, 1996. "Consistency and the Walrasian Allocations Correspondence," Economics Working Papers 151, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-1998-09-14 (All new papers)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Peleg, B, 1986. "On the Reduced Game Property and Its Converse," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 187-200.
van den Nouweland, A. & Peleg, B. & Tijs, S., 1996. "Axiomatic characterizations of the Walras correspondence for generalized economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 355-372. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Thomson, William & Zhou, Lin, 1993. "Consistent Solutions in Atomless Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 575-87, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Lensberg, Terje, 1988. "Stability and the Nash solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 330-341, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Peleg, Bezalel, 1985. "An axiomatization of the core of cooperative games without side payments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 203-214, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1989. "Potential, Value, and Consistency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 589-614, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Nir Dagan, 1995. "Consistent Solutions in Exchange Economies: A Characterization of the Price Mechanism," Economics Working Papers 141, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Nir Dagan, 1995. "Consistent Solutions in Exchange Economies: a Characterization of the Price Mechanism," Economic theory and game theory 011, Nir Dagan. [Downloadable!]

Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Nir Dagan, 1994. "Recontracting and Competition," Economics Working Papers 152, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jan 1996. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Nir Dagan, 1996. "Recontracting and Competition," Economic theory and game theory 013, Nir Dagan, revised Jun 1996. [Downloadable!]
Sjaak Hurkens & Nir Vulkan, 1996. "Information Acquisition and Entry," Economics Working Papers 155, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Hurkens, Sjaak & Vulkan, Nir, 2001. "Information acquisition and entry," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 44(4), pages 467-479, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Daron Acemoglu & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 1996. "Agency Costs in the Process of Development," Economics Working Papers 157, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Acemoglu, Daron & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 1997. "Agency costs in the process of development," Seminar Papers 607, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies. [Downloadable!]
- Acemoglu, Daron & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 1996. "Agency Costs in the Process of Development," CEPR Discussion Papers 1421, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Acemoglu, D & Zilibotti, F, 1996. "Agency Costs in the Process of Development," Papers 607, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
- Acemoglu, D. & Zilibotti, F., 1996. "Agency Costs in the Process of Development," Working papers 96-8, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.

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