We characterize the Walrasian allocations correspondence by means of consistency requirements and other axioms. We present two characterization results; both require consistency, converse consistency and standard axioms. One of them requires the allocations to be envy free (with respect to trades) and the other--stable with respect to bilateral recontracting. The characterizations hold in classes of exchange economies with smooth and convex preferences, and also on domains with a finite number of potential agents.
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Length: 16 pages Date of creation: Jan 1996 Date of revision:
Sep 1997 Handle: RePEc:nid:ndagan:012
Contact details of provider: Postal: Nir Dagan, Dept. of Economics and Business, the College of Judea and Samaria, Ariel, Israel. Web page: http://www.nirdagan.com/research/
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