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Axiomatizations of Neoclassical Concepts for Economies

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  • Volij, Oscar
  • Serrano, Roberto

Abstract

We characterize the Pareto correspondence, the core and the Walras solution using the axioms of consistency, converse consistency and one-person rationality. Consistency and its converse are defined with respect to suitably constructed reduced economies for each case. Our results hold for the well-known class of coalitional production economies, which covers exchange economies as a particular case. The key reason to use this class is the observation that the reduction of an exchange economy yields a production economy. Author Keywords: Consistency; Reduced economy; Core; Walrasian equilibrium

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Iowa State University, Department of Economics in its series Staff General Research Papers with number 5192.

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Date of creation: 01 Jan 1998
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Publication status: Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics 1998, vol. 30, pp. 87-108
Handle: RePEc:isu:genres:5192

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Postal: Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070
Phone: +1 515.294.6741
Fax: +1 515.294.0221
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Web page: http://www.econ.iastate.edu
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References

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  1. Peleg, Bezalel & Tijs, Stef, 1996. "The Consistency Principle for Games in Strategic Forms," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 13-34.
  2. van den Nouweland, A. & Peleg, B. & Tijs, S., 1996. "Axiomatic characterizations of the Walras correspondence for generalized economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 355-372.
  3. Boehm, Volker, 1974. "The Limit of the Core of an Economy with Production," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 15(1), pages 143-48, February.
  4. Thomson, William & Zhou, Lin, 1993. "Consistent Solutions in Atomless Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 575-87, May.
  5. Thomson, William, 1988. "A study of choice correspondences in economies with a variable number of agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 237-254, December.
  6. Peleg, Bezalel, 1985. "An axiomatization of the core of cooperative games without side payments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 203-214, April.
  7. Nir Dagan, 1996. "Recontracting and Competition," Economic theory and game theory 013, Nir Dagan, revised Jun 1996.
  8. Peleg, B, 1986. "On the Reduced Game Property and Its Converse," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 187-200.
  9. Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1989. "Potential, Value, and Consistency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 589-614, May.
  10. Nagahisa, Ryo-ichi, 1991. "A local independence condition for characterization of Walrasian allocations rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 106-123, June.
  11. Lensberg, Terje, 1988. "Stability and the Nash solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 330-341, August.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. İpek Özkal-Sanver, 2013. "Minimal conversely consistent extension of the men-optimal solution," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 89-99, January.
  2. Volij, Oscar & Lee, Darin, 2000. "The Core of Economies with Asymmetric Information: An Axiomatic Approach," Staff General Research Papers 5193, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  3. Yan-An Hwang, 2006. "Two characterizations of the consistent egalitarian solution and of the core on NTU games," Computational Statistics, Springer, vol. 64(3), pages 557-568, December.
  4. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2008:i:45:p:1-6 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Albizuri, M. Josune & Sudhölter, Peter, 2014. "On the Core of Games with Communication Structures," Discussion Papers of Business and Economics 6/2014, Department of Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark.
  6. Yan-An Hwang, 2013. "On the core: complement-reduced game and max-reduced game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 339-355, May.
  7. Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Cooperative Games: Core And Shapley Value," Working Papers wp2007_0709, CEMFI.
  8. Yan-An Hwang & Yu-Hsien Liao, 2010. "The unit-level-core for multi-choice games: the replicated core for TU games," Journal of Global Optimization, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 161-171, June.
  9. Thomson, William, 2011. "Chapter Twenty-One - Fair Allocation Rules," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 21, pages 393-506 Elsevier.
  10. de CLIPPEL, Geoffroy, 2003. "Invariance with respect to re-evaluations of coalitional power," CORE Discussion Papers 2003056, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  11. Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Nash program," Working Papers 2007-05, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
  12. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2007:i:37:p:1-6 is not listed on IDEAS
  13. Yan-An Hwang & Yu-Hsien Liao, 2011. "The multi-core, balancedness and axiomatizations for multi-choice games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 40(4), pages 677-689, November.
  14. Camelia Bejan & Juan Gómez, 2012. "Axiomatizing core extensions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 41(4), pages 885-898, November.
  15. Yu-Hsien Liao, 2008. "Consistency and the core for fuzzy non-transferable-utility games," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(45), pages 1-6.
  16. Geoffroy de Clippel, 2005. "An Axiomatization of the Inner Core Using Appropriate Reduced Games," Working Papers 2005-02, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  17. Yan-An Hwang & Yu-Hsien Liao, 2007. "A new axiomatization of the core on fuzzy NTU games," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(37), pages 1-6.

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