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Axiomatizations of Neoclassical Concepts for Economies

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  • Volij, Oscar
  • Serrano, Roberto

Abstract

We characterize the Pareto correspondence, the core and the Walras solution using the axioms of consistency, converse consistency and one-person rationality. Consistency and its converse are defined with respect to suitably constructed reduced economies for each case. Our results hold for the well-known class of coalitional production economies, which covers exchange economies as a particular case. The key reason to use this class is the observation that the reduction of an exchange economy yields a production economy. Author Keywords: Consistency; Reduced economy; Core; Walrasian equilibrium

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Iowa State University, Department of Economics in its series Staff General Research Papers with number 5192.

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Date of creation: 01 Jan 1998
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Publication status: Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics 1998, vol. 30, pp. 87-108
Handle: RePEc:isu:genres:5192

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Postal: Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070
Phone: +1 515.294.6741
Fax: +1 515.294.0221
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Web page: http://www.econ.iastate.edu
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References

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  1. Peleg, B. & Tijs, S.H., 1993. "The consistency principle for games in strategic form," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 1993-6, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  2. van den Nouweland, A. & Peleg, B. & Tijs, S., 1996. "Axiomatic characterizations of the Walras correspondence for generalized economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 355-372.
  3. Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1989. "Potential, Value, and Consistency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 589-614, May.
  4. Nir Dagan, 1994. "Recontracting and competition," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra 152, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jan 1996.
  5. Thomson, William, 1988. "A study of choice correspondences in economies with a variable number of agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 237-254, December.
  6. Peleg, B, 1986. "On the Reduced Game Property and Its Converse," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 187-200.
  7. Peleg, Bezalel, 1985. "An axiomatization of the core of cooperative games without side payments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 203-214, April.
  8. Nagahisa, Ryo-ichi, 1991. "A local independence condition for characterization of Walrasian allocations rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 106-123, June.
  9. Lensberg, Terje, 1988. "Stability and the Nash solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 330-341, August.
  10. Thomson, William & Zhou, Lin, 1993. "Consistent Solutions in Atomless Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 575-87, May.
  11. Boehm, Volker, 1974. "The Limit of the Core of an Economy with Production," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 15(1), pages 143-48, February.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. de CLIPPEL, Geoffroy, 2003. "Invariance with respect to re-evaluations of coalitional power," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 2003056, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. Yu-Hsien Liao, 2008. "Consistency and the core for fuzzy non-transferable-utility games," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(45), pages 1-6.
  3. Darin Lee & Oscar Volij, 1997. "The Core of Economies with Asymmetric Information: An Axiomatic Approach," Economic theory and game theory, Oscar Volij 005, Oscar Volij.
  4. Yan-An Hwang & Yu-Hsien Liao, 2007. "A new axiomatization of the core on fuzzy NTU games," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(37), pages 1-6.
  5. Yan-An Hwang & Yu-Hsien Liao, 2010. "The unit-level-core for multi-choice games: the replicated core for TU games," Journal of Global Optimization, Springer, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 161-171, June.
  6. Yan-An Hwang, 2006. "Two characterizations of the consistent egalitarian solution and of the core on NTU games," Computational Statistics, Springer, Springer, vol. 64(3), pages 557-568, December.
  7. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2007:i:37:p:1-6 is not listed on IDEAS
  8. İpek Özkal-Sanver, 2013. "Minimal conversely consistent extension of the men-optimal solution," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 89-99, January.
  9. Yan-An Hwang & Yu-Hsien Liao, 2011. "The multi-core, balancedness and axiomatizations for multi-choice games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 40(4), pages 677-689, November.
  10. Yan-An Hwang, 2013. "On the core: complement-reduced game and max-reduced game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 339-355, May.
  11. de Clippel, Geoffroy, 2008. "An axiomatization of the inner core using appropriate reduced games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(3-4), pages 316-323, February.
  12. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2008:i:45:p:1-6 is not listed on IDEAS
  13. Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Nash program," Working Papers, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales 2007-05, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
  14. Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Cooperative Games: Core and Shapley Value," Working Papers 2007-11, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  15. Camelia Bejan & Juan Gómez, 2012. "Axiomatizing core extensions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 41(4), pages 885-898, November.
  16. Albizuri, M. Josune & Sudhölter, Peter, 2014. "On the Core of Games with Communication Structures," Discussion Papers of Business and Economics 6/2014, Department of Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark.
  17. Thomson, William, 2011. "Chapter Twenty-One - Fair Allocation Rules," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Elsevier, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 21, pages 393-506 Elsevier.

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