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Axiomatizations of Neoclassical Concepts for Economies

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  • Volij, Oscar
  • Serrano, Roberto

Abstract

We characterize the Pareto correspondence, the core and the Walras solution using the axioms of consistency, converse consistency and one-person rationality. Consistency and its converse are defined with respect to suitably constructed reduced economies for each case. Our results hold for the well-known class of coalitional production economies, which covers exchange economies as a particular case. The key reason to use this class is the observation that the reduction of an exchange economy yields a production economy. Author Keywords: Consistency; Reduced economy; Core; Walrasian equilibrium

Suggested Citation

  • Volij, Oscar & Serrano, Roberto, 1998. "Axiomatizations of Neoclassical Concepts for Economies," Staff General Research Papers Archive 5192, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:isu:genres:5192
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    References listed on IDEAS

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