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An axiomatization of the leveling tax-transfer policy

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Author Info
Nir Dagan

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Abstract

We show that the leveling tax-transfer policy is the only consistent policy that exploits the maximum allowed transfers, as long as these are no more than the amount sufficient to equalize after-tax incomes. The leveling policy stands in contrast to equal sacrifice policies, which are also consistent but do not conduct any transfers.

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Paper provided by Nir Dagan in its series Economic theory and game theory with number 020.

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Length: 11 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nid:ndagan:020

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Postal: Nir Dagan, Dept. of Economics and Management, Tel-Hai Academic College, Upper Galilee, Israel.
Web page: http://www.nirdagan.com/research/

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Nir Dagan).

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General

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References listed on IDEAS
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    Other versions:
  8. Thomson, William, 1988. "A study of choice correspondences in economies with a variable number of agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 237-254, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Thomson, William, 2003. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 249-297, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Peleg, Bezalel, 1985. "An axiomatization of the core of cooperative games without side payments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 203-214, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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