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An axiomatization of the leveling tax-transfer policy

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We show that the leveling tax-transfer policy is the only consistent policy that exploits the maximum allowed transfers, as long as these are no more than the amount sufficient to equalize after-tax incomes. The leveling policy stands in contrast to equal sacrifice policies, which are also consistent but do not conduct any transfers.

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Paper provided by Nir Dagan in its series Economic theory and game theory with number 020.

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Length: 11 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nid:ndagan:020

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Postal: Nir Dagan, Dept. of Economics and Management, Tel-Hai Academic College, Upper Galilee, Israel.
Web page: http://www.nirdagan.com/research/

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  1. William Thomson, 2007. "Lorenz rankings of rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims," RCER Working Papers 538, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  2. Nir Dagan, 1996. "New Characterizations of Old Bankruptcy Rules," Economic theory and game theory 002, Nir Dagan.
  3. Young, H. P., 1988. "Distributive justice in taxation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 321-335, April.
  4. Thomson, William, 2003. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 249-297, July.
  5. Lahiri, Somdeb, 2001. "Axiomatic characterizations of the CEA solution for rationing problems," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 162-170, May.
  6. Lensberg, Terje, 1988. "Stability and the Nash solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 330-341, August.
  7. Thomson, William, 1988. "A study of choice correspondences in economies with a variable number of agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 237-254, December.
  8. Chun-Hsien Yeh, 2006. "Protective Properties and the Constrained Equal Awards Rule for Claims Problems: A Note," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 221-230, October.
  9. Thomson William, 1994. "Consistent Solutions to the Problem of Fair Division When Preferences Are Single-Peaked," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 219-245, August.
  10. Lensberg, Terje, 1987. "Stability and Collective Rationality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(4), pages 935-61, July.
  11. Peleg, B, 1986. "On the Reduced Game Property and Its Converse," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 187-200.
  12. Peleg, Bezalel, 1985. "An axiomatization of the core of cooperative games without side payments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 203-214, April.
  13. Thomson, W., 1998. "Consistency and its Converse: an Introduction," RCER Working Papers 448, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  14. Aumann, Robert J. & Maschler, Michael, 1985. "Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-213, August.
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