An axiomatization of the leveling tax-transfer policy
AbstractWe show that the leveling tax-transfer policy is the only consistent policy that exploits the maximum allowed transfers, as long as these are no more than the amount sufficient to equalize after-tax incomes. The leveling policy stands in contrast to equal sacrifice policies, which are also consistent but do not conduct any transfers.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Nir Dagan in its series Economic theory and game theory with number 020.
Length: 11 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2008
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Nir Dagan, Dept. of Economics and Management, Tel-Hai Academic College, Upper Galilee, Israel.
Web page: http://www.nirdagan.com/research/
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-04-21 (All new papers)
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