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A Non-Cooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules

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Author Info
Volij, Oscar
Dagan, Nir
Serrano, Roberto

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Abstract

We introduce a game form that captures a noncooperative dimension of the consistency property of bankruptcy rules. Any consistent and monotone rule is fully characterized by a bilateral principle and consistency. Like the consistency axiom, our game form, together with a bilateral principle, yields the corresponding consistent bankruptcy rule as a result of a unique outcome of Nash equilibria. The result holds for a large class of consistent and monotone rules, including the Constrained Equal Award, the Propositional Rule, and many other well known rules. Moreover, all of the subgame perfect equilibria are coalition-proof in the associated game in strategic form.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Iowa State University, Department of Economics in its series Staff General Research Papers with number 5130.

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Date of creation: 01 Mar 2002
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Publication status: Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 1997, Vol. 18, pp. 55-72.
Handle: RePEc:isu:genres:5130

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Postal: Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070
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  1. Antonio villar, 2005. "How to distribute when there is scarce situation," Lecturas de Economía, Universidad de Antioquia, Departamento de Economía, issue 62, pages 9-33, Enero-Jun. [Downloadable!]
  2. Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 1999. "Feasible Implementation of Taxation Methods," Economic theory and game theory 009, Nir Dagan. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Ignacio García-Jurado & Julio González-Díaz & Antonio Villar, 2006. "A Non-cooperative Approach to Bankruptcy Problems," Spanish Economic Review, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 189-197, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. José M. Jiménez Gómez & María del Carmen Marco, 2008. "A New Approach for Bounding Awards in Bankruptcy Problems," Working Papers. Serie AD 2008-07, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
  5. Juan de Dios Moreno Ternero & Antonio Villar Notario, 2002. "Bankruptcy Rules And Progressive Taxation," Working Papers. Serie AD 2002-15, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
  6. Antonio Villar Notario & Carmen Herrero Blanco, 2000. "The Three Musketeers: Four Classical Solutions To Bankruptcy Problems," Working Papers. Serie AD 2000-23, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
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  7. Herrero & C., 2004. "On the Adjudication of Conflicting Claims: An Experimental Study," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 166, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Carmen Herrero, 2000. "The Three Musketeers. Old Solutions to Bankruptcy Problems," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0609, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  9. Veronika Grimm & Giovanni Ponti & Jaromir Kovarik, 2006. "Fixed Price Plus Rationing: An Experiment," Working Papers. Serie AD 2006-26, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
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  10. De MESNARD, Louis, 2008. "On the Talmud division : equity and robustness," LEG - Document de travail - Economie 2008-07, LEG, Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion, CNRS UMR 5118, Université de Bourgogne. [Downloadable!]
  11. Simon Gächter & Arno Riedl, 2006. "Dividing Justly in Bargaining Problems with Claims," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 571-594, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Luis Corchon & Matthias Dahm, 2007. "Foundations For Contest Success Functions," Economics Working Papers we070401, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
  13. Juan de Dios Moreno Ternero & Carmen Herrero Blanco & Giovanni Ponti, 2003. "An Experiment On Bankruptcy," Working Papers. Serie AD 2003-03, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
  14. Chun-Hsien Yeh, 2004. "Protective properties and the constrained equal awards rule for claims problems," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 463, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  15. Karagozoglu, Emin, 2008. "A Noncooperative Approach to Bankruptcy Problems with an Endogenous Estate," Research Memoranda 031, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
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