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The Talmud Rule And The Securement Of Agents? Awards

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Author Info
Juan de Dios Moreno Ternero () (Yale University)
Antonio Villar Notario (Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas)

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Abstract

This paper provides a new characterization of the Talmud rule by means of a new property, called securement. This property says that any agent holding a feasible claim will get at least one nht of her claim, where n is the number of agents involved. We show that securement together with a weak version of path independence and the standard properties of self-duality and consistency characterize the Talmud rule.

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File URL: http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-2003-05.pdf
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File Function: Fisrt version / Primera version, 2003
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) in its series Working Papers. Serie AD with number 2003-05.

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Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2003
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Publication status: Published by Ivie
Handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2003-05

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Related research
Keywords: bankruptcy problems; Talmud rule; characterization results;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. O'Neill, Barry, 1982. "A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 345-371, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Herrero, Carmen & Villar, Antonio, 2001. "The three musketeers: four classical solutions to bankruptcy problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 307-328, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Juan Moreno-Ternero & Antonio Villar, 2006. "The TAL-Family of Rules for Bankruptcy Problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 231-249, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Thomson, W., 1996. "Consistent Allocation Rules," RCER Working Papers 418, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  5. Hervé Moulin, 2000. "Priority Rules and Other Asymmetric Rationing Methods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(3), pages 643-684, May.
  6. Aumann, Robert J. & Maschler, Michael, 1985. "Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-213, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Nir Dagan, 1996. "New Characterizations of Old Bankruptcy Rules," Economic theory and game theory 002, Nir Dagan. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Thomson, William, 2003. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 249-297, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Moulin, Herve, 2002. "Axiomatic cost and surplus sharing," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 289-357 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Juan Moreno-Ternero, 2006. "Composition, Securement, and Concede-and-divide," Spanish Economic Review, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 227-237, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Antonio villar, 2005. "How to distribute when there is scarce situation," Lecturas de Economía, Universidad de Antioquia, Departamento de Economía, issue 62, pages 9-33, Enero-Jun. [Downloadable!]
  3. De MESNARD, Louis, 2008. "On the Talmud division : equity and robustness," LEG - Document de travail - Economie 2008-07, LEG, Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion, CNRS UMR 5118, Université de Bourgogne. [Downloadable!]
  4. Karagozoglu, Emin, 2008. "Distributive Concerns in the Bankruptcy Problem with an Endogenous Estate," Research Memoranda 032, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  5. José M. Jiménez Gómez & María del Carmen Marco, 2008. "A New Approach for Bounding Awards in Bankruptcy Problems," Working Papers. Serie AD 2008-07, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
  6. Juan Moreno-Ternero & Antonio Villar, 2006. "The TAL-Family of Rules for Bankruptcy Problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 231-249, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Diego Dominguez & William Thomson, 2004. "A New Solution to the Problem of Adjudicating Conflicting Claims," RCER Working Papers 511, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Quant, M. & Borm, Peter & Maaten, Rogier, 2005. "A concede-and-divide rule for bankruptcy problems," Discussion Paper 20, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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