We introduce a game form that captures a noncooperative dimention of the consistency property of bankruptcy rules. Any consistent and monotonic rule is fully characterized by a bilateral principle and consistency. Like the consistency axiom, our game form, together with the bilateral principle, yields the corresponding consistent bankruptcy rule as a result of a unique outcome of Nash equilibria. The result holds for a large class of consistent monotone rules, including the Constrained Equal Award, the Proportional Rule, and many other well known rules. Moreover, all the subgame perfect equilibria are coalition-proof in the associated game in strategic form.
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Length: 18 pages Date of creation: 1997 Date of revision: Publication status: Published in Games and Economic Behavior 18:55-72 (1997) Handle: RePEc:nid:ndagan:005
Contact details of provider: Postal: Nir Dagan, Dept. of Economics and Business, the College of Judea and Samaria, Ariel, Israel. Web page: http://www.nirdagan.com/research/
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Nir Dagan).
Find related papers by JEL classification: C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
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Juan de Dios Moreno Ternero & Carmen Herrero Blanco & Giovanni Ponti, 2003.
"An Experiment On Bankruptcy,"
Working Papers. Serie AD
2003-03, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
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