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Invariance and Randomness in the Nash Program for Coalitional Games

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Author Info
Nir Dagan
Roberto Serrano

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Abstract

By introducing physical outcomes in coalitional games we note that coalitional games and social choice problems are equivalent (implying that so are the theory of implementation and the Nash program). This facilitates the understanding of the role of invariance and randomness in the Nash program. Also, the extent to which mechanisms in the Nash program perform ``real implementation'' is examined.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 217.

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Date of creation: Jan 1997
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Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:217

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Web page: http://www.econ.upf.edu/

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Related research
Keywords: Coalitional games; social choice; Nash program; implementation; scale invariance; ordinal invariance; randomness;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

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  1. Trockel,W., 1999. "Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory," Working Papers 305, Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Roberto Serrano, 2004. "Fifty Years of the Nash Program, 1953-2003," Working Papers 2004-20, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Claus-Jochen Haake, 2005. "Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets," Working Papers 366, Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Trockel,W., 2001. "Can and should the Nash program be looked at as a part of mechanism theory?," Working Papers 322, Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Walter Trockel, 1999. "On the Nash Program for the Nash Bargaining Solution," UCLA Economics Working Papers 788, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Trockel,W., 1999. "Unique Nash implementation for a class of bargaining solutions," Working Papers 308, Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, . "Bidding For The Surplus: A Non-Cooperative Approach To The Shapley Value," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 461.00, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Luis C. Corchon & Matteo Triosi, 2005. "Implementation With State Dependent Feasible Sets And Preferences: A Renegotiation Approach," Economics Working Papers we057136, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Claus-Jochen Haake & Walter Trockel, 2007. "On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules," Working Papers 393, Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics. [Downloadable!]
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