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Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games

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Author Info

  • Nir Dagan
  • Roberto Serrano

Abstract

By introducing physical outcomes in coalitional games we note that coalitional games and social choice problems are equivalent (implying that so are the theory of implementation and the Nash program). This facilitates the understanding of the role of invariance and randomness in the Nash program. Also, the extent to which mechanisms in the Nash program perform ``real implementation'' is examined.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 217.

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Date of creation: Jan 1997
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Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:217

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Web page: http://www.econ.upf.edu/

Related research

Keywords: Coalitional games; social choice; Nash program; implementation; scale invariance; ordinal invariance; randomness;

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References

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  1. Thomson, W., 1989. "Cooperative Models Of Bargaining," RCER Working Papers 177, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  2. Krishna, Vijay & Serrano, Roberto, 1996. "Multilateral Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(1), pages 61-80, January.
  3. Abreu, Dilip & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1992. "A Response [Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies I: Complete Information]," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(6), pages 1439-42, November.
  4. Gul, Faruk, 1989. "Bargaining Foundations of Shapley Value," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(1), pages 81-95, January.
  5. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
  6. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
  7. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 252, David K. Levine.
  8. Abreu, Dilip & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1992. "Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 993-1008, September.
  9. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1994. "Bargaining and value," Economics Working Papers 114, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Feb 1995.
  10. Serrano, Roberto, 1997. "A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 203-208, August.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Trockel,W., 1999. "Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory," Working Papers 305, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  2. Matteo Triossi & Luis Corchón, 2006. "Implementation with State Dependent Feasible Sets and Preferences: A Renegotiation Approach," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 24, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
  3. Roberto Serrano, 2005. "Fifty years of the Nash program, 1953-2003," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 29(2), pages 219-258, May.
  4. Claus-Jochen Haake & Walter Trockel, 2010. "On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 17-25, March.
  5. Trockel,W., 1999. "On the Nash program for the Nash bargaining solution," Working Papers 306, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  6. Naeve, Jorg, 1999. "Nash implementation of the Nash bargaining solution using intuitive message spaces," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 23-28, January.
  7. Güth, W. & Ritzberger, K. & Damme, E.E.C. van, 2002. "On the Nash Bargaining Solution with Noise," Discussion Paper 2002-79, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  8. Trockel,W., 1999. "Unique Nash implementation for a class of bargaining solutions," Working Papers 308, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  9. Haake, Claus-Jochen, 2009. "Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 177-187, March.
  10. Luis Corchón & Matteo Triossi, 2008. "Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent," Documentos de Trabajo 255, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
  11. Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2001. "Bidding for the Surplus : A Non-cooperative Approach to the Shapley Value," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 274-294, October.
  12. Trockel,W., 2001. "Can and should the Nash program be looked at as a part of mechanism theory?," Working Papers 322, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  13. Claus-Jochen Haake, 2005. "Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets," Working Papers 366, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.

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