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Noncooperative Models Of Bargaining

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  • BINMORE, K.
  • OSBORNE, M.J.
  • RUBINSTEIN, A.

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  • Binmore, K. & Osborne, M.J. & Rubinstein, A., 1989. "Noncooperative Models Of Bargaining," Papers 89-26, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:michet:89-26
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