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Implementing Cooperative Solution Concepts: a Generalized Bidding Approach

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Author Info

  • Yuan Ju

    ()
    (Keele University, Centre for Economic Research and School of Economic and Management Studies)

  • David Wettstein

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev)

Abstract

This paper provides a framework for implementing and comparing several solution concepts for transferable utility cooperative games.We construct bidding mechanisms where players bid for the role of the proposer. The mechanisms differ in the power awarded to the proposer. The Shapley, consensus and equal surplus values are implemented in subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes as power shifts away from the proposer to the rest of the players. Moreover, an alternative informational structure where these solution concepts can be implemented without imposing any conditions of the transferable utility game is discussed as well.

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File URL: http://www.keele.ac.uk/depts/ec/wpapers/kerp0606.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Centre for Economic Research, Keele University in its series Keele Economics Research Papers with number KERP 2006/06.

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Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:kee:kerpuk:2006/06

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Postal: Department of Economics, University of Keele, Keele, Staffordshire, ST5 5BG - United Kingdom
Phone: +44 (0)1782 584581
Fax: +44 (0)1782 717577
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Web page: http://www.keele.ac.uk/depts/ec/cer/
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Postal: Centre for Economic Research, Research Institute for Public Policy and Management, Keele University, Staffordshire ST5 5BG - United Kingdom
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Web: http://www.keele.ac.uk/depts/ec/cer/pubs_kerps.htm

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Keywords: Implementation; bidding mechanism; Shapley value; consensus value; equal surplus value.;

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References

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  1. Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2005. "Efficient Bidding with Externalities," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 641.05, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Ju, Y. & Borm, P.E.M., 2006. "A Non-cooperative Approach to the Compensation Rules for Primeval Games," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 2006-97, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  2. Emilio Calvo & Esther Gutiérrez-López, 2014. "A strategic approach for the discounted Shapley values," Discussion Papers in Economic Behaviour 0414, University of Valencia, ERI-CES.
  3. David Pérez-Castrillo & Nicolas Quérou, 2011. "Smooth Multibidding Mechanisms," CESifo Working Paper Series 3394, CESifo Group Munich.
  4. Ju, Y. & Borm, P.E.M. & Ruys, P.H.M., 2007. "The consensus value: A new solution concept for cooperative games," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-195202, Tilburg University.
  5. Rene van den Brink & Gerard van der Laan & Nigel Moes, 2012. "A Strategic Implementation of the Average Tree Solution for Cycle-Free Graph Games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-050/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  6. René van den Brink & Yukihiko Funaki & Yuan Ju, 2007. "Consistency, Monotonicity and Implementation of Egalitarian Shapley Values," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 07-062/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  7. Ju, Y. & Borm, P.E.M., 2005. "Externalities and Compensation: Primeval Games and Solutions," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 2005-71, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  8. Ju, Yuan, 2012. "Reject and renegotiate: The Shapley value in multilateral bargaining," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(6), pages 431-436.
  9. Rene van den Brink & Yukihiko Funaki, 2010. "Axiomatization and Implementation of Discounted Shapley Values," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 10-065/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  10. Toyotaka Sakai, 2012. "Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 50(2), pages 499-521, June.
  11. Gustavo Bergantiños & María Gómez-Rúa, 2010. "Minimum cost spanning tree problems with groups," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 43(2), pages 227-262, May.
  12. René van den Brink & Yukihiko Funaki & Yuan Ju, 2007. "Consistency, Monotonicity and Implementation of Egalitarian Shapley Values," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 07-062/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  13. Rene van den Brink & Youngsub Chun & Yuan Ju, 2014. "Auctioning and Selling Positions: A Non-cooperative Approach to Queuing Conflicts," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 14-016/II, Tinbergen Institute.
  14. Rene van den Brink & Gerard van der Laan & Nigel Moes, 2012. "A Strategic Implementation of the Average Tree Solution for Cycle-Free Graph Games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-050/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  15. René Brink & Yukihiko Funaki & Yuan Ju, 2013. "Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 693-714, March.

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