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Implementation with State Dependent Feasible Sets and Preferences: A Renegotiation Approach

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Author Info
Matteo Triossi
Luis Corchón

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Abstract

In this paper we present a model of implementation based on the idea that agents renegotiate unfeasible allocations. We characterize the maximal set of Social Choice Correspondences that can be implemented in Nash Equilibrium with a class of renegotiation functions that do not reward agents for unfeasibilities. This result is used to study the possibility of implementing the Walrasian Correspondence in exchange economies and several axiomatic solutions to problems of bargaining and bankruptcy.

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Paper provided by Collegio Carlo Alberto in its series Carlo Alberto Notebooks with number 24.

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Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: 2006
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Handle: RePEc:cca:wpaper:24

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Related research
Keywords: State Dependent Feasible Sets Renegotiation Implementation.

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij & Roberto Serrano, 1999. "Feasible implementation of taxation methods," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 57-72. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Serrano, Roberto, 1997. "A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 203-208, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Eric Maskin & John Moore, 1999. "Implementation and Renegotiation," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1863, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    Other versions:
  4. John Londregan & Andrea Vindigni, 2006. "Voting as a Credible Threat," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 18, Collegio Carlo Alberto. [Downloadable!]
  5. Michele Piccione & Ariel Rubinstein, 2007. "Equilibrium in the Jungle," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(522), pages 883-896, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Maristella Botticini & Zvi Eckstein, 2006. "From Farmers to Merchants, Voluntary Conversion and Diaspora: A Human Capital Interpretation of Jewish History," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 2, Collegio Carlo Alberto. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Luis C. Corchon & Matteo Triosi, 2005. "Implementation With State Dependent Feasible Sets And Preferences: A Renegotiation Approach," Economics Working Papers we057136, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Larry G. Epstein & Massimo Marinacci, 2006. "Mutual Absolute Continuity of Multiple Priors," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 19, Collegio Carlo Alberto. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Daniela Del Boca & Robert M. Sauer, 2006. "Life Cycle Employment and Fertility Across Institutional Environments," IZA Discussion Papers 2285, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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  10. Hong, Lu, 1995. "Nash Implementation in Production Economies," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 401-17, May.
  11. Dagan, Nir & Serrano, Roberto, 1998. "Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 43-49, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Luigi Montrucchio & Patrizia Semeraro, 2006. "Refinement Derivatives and Values of Games," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 9, Collegio Carlo Alberto. [Downloadable!]
  13. Lu Hong, 1996. "Bayesian implementation in exchange economies with state dependent feasible sets and private information," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 433-444.
  14. Benassy, Jean-Pascal, 1986. "On Competitive Market Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(1), pages 95-108, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Maskin, Eric, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Matteo Triossi, 2006. "Application Costs in Sequential Admission Mechanisms," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 23, Collegio Carlo Alberto. [Downloadable!]
  17. M. Amarante & F. Maccheroni & M. Marinacci & L. Montrucchio, 2006. "Cores of non-atomic market games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 399-424, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  18. Naeve, Jorg, 1999. "Nash implementation of the Nash bargaining solution using intuitive message spaces," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 23-28, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Tian, Guoqiang, 1993. "Implementing Lindahl allocations by a withholding mechanism," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 169-179. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 1997. "Non-cooperative implementation of the core," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 513-525. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Londregan, John & Vindigni, Andrea, 2006. "Voting as a Credible Threat," Papers 10-04-2006, Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
  22. Tian Guoqiang & Li Qi, 1995. "On Nash-Implementation in the Presence of Withholding," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 222-233, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Andrea Buffa & Giovanna Nicodano, 2006. "Should Insider Trading be Prohibited when Share Repurchases are Allowed?," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 16, Collegio Carlo Alberto. [Downloadable!]
  24. Jackson, Matthew O. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2001. "Voluntary Implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 1-25, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Jackson, Matthew O. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 1999. "Voluntary Implementation," Working Papers 1077, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Paolo Ghirardato & Fabio Maccheroni & Massimo Marinacci, 2007. "Revealed Ambiguity and Its Consequences: Updating," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 44, Collegio Carlo Alberto. [Downloadable!]
  2. Matteo Triossi & Luis Corchón, 2006. "Implementation with State Dependent Feasible Sets and Preferences: A Renegotiation Approach," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 24, Collegio Carlo Alberto. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Daron Acemoglu & Davide Ticchi & Andrea Vindigni, 2008. "A Theory of Military Dictatorships," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 74, Collegio Carlo Alberto. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Elisa Luciano & Elena Vigna, 2006. "Non mean reverting affne processes for stochastic mortality," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 30, Collegio Carlo Alberto. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Itzhak Gilboa & Fabio Maccheroni & Massimo Marinacci & David Schmeidler, 2008. "Objective and Subjective Rationality in a Multiple Prior Model," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 73, Collegio Carlo Alberto. [Downloadable!]
  6. Daron Acemoglu & Victor Chernozhukov & Muhamet Yildiz, 2007. "Learning and Disagreement in an Uncertain World," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 48, Collegio Carlo Alberto. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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