Implementation via mechanisms with transfers
AbstractWe consider the following problem: suppose that the social choice rule is given, but the planner has the opportunity to redistribute among agents some numeraire commodity ("money") by compensatory transfers; can the planner find a transfer such that the social choice rule is Nash implementable by the transfer? In this paper, we establish a necessary and sufficient condition for Nash implementation by transfers. Furthermore, we construct a simplified mechanism, which Nash-implements the desired social choice rule by transfers.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.
Volume (Year): 61 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565
Nash implementation Monotonicity Semi-monotonicity Transfers;
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