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Nash implementation and uncertain renegotiation

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  • Amoros, Pablo

Abstract

This paper studies Nash implementation when the outcomes of the mechanism can be renegotiated among the agents but the planner does not know the renegotiation function that they will use. We characterize the social objectives that can be implemented in Nash equilibrium when the same mechanism must work for every admissible renegotiation function. The constrained Walrasian correspondence, the core correspondence, and the Pareto-efficient and envy-free correspondence satisfy the necessary and sufficient conditions for this form of implementation if and only if freedisposal of the commodities is allowed. The uniform rule, on the other hand, is not Nash implementable for some admissible renegotiations functions.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 49 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (November)
Pages: 424-434

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:49:y:2004:i:2:p:424-434

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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References

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  1. Jackson, Matthew O. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2001. "Voluntary Implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 1-25, May.
  2. Maskin, Eric & Moore, John, 1999. "Implementation and Renegotiation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(1), pages 39-56, January.
  3. Arya, Anil & Glover, Jonathan & Hughes, John S., 1997. "Implementing Coordinated Team Play," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 218-232, May.
  4. Leonid Hurwicz, 1994. "Economic design, adjustment processes, mechanisms, and institutions," Review of Economic Design, Springer, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 1-14, December.
  5. Chakravorty, Bhaskar & Corchon, Luis C. & Wilkie, Simon, 2006. "Credible implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 18-36, October.
  6. Baliga, Sandeep & Corchon, Luis C. & Sjostrom, Tomas, 1997. "The Theory of Implementation When the Planner Is a Player," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 15-33, November.
  7. Matthew O. Jackson & Thomas R. Palfrey, 1997. "Efficiency and Voluntary Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Bargaining," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 9711003, EconWPA.
  8. Eric Maskin, 1998. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  9. Ma, Ching-to & Moore, John & Turnbull, Stephen, 1988. "Stopping agents from "cheating"," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 355-372, December.
  10. Pablo AmorÕs & Bernardo Moreno, 2001. "original papers : Implementation of optimal contracts under adverse selection," Review of Economic Design, Springer, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 41-61.
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Cited by:
  1. Neeman, Zvika & Pavlov, Gregory, 2013. "Ex post renegotiation-proof mechanism design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 473-501.
  2. Yi, Jianxin, 2011. "Implementation via mechanisms with transfers," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 65-70, January.
  3. Luis C. Corchon, 2007. "The theory of implementation : what did we learn?," Economics Working Papers we081207, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
  4. Zvika Neeman & Gregory Pavlov, 2010. "Renegotiation-proof Mechanism Design," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics 20101, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  5. Luis C. Corchon & Matteo Triosi, 2005. "Implementation With State Dependent Feasible Sets And Preferences: A Renegotiation Approach," Economics Working Papers we057136, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.

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