• NEP-ALL-2002-11-04 (All new papers)
• NEP-GTH-2002-11-04 (Game Theory)

1. Segal, Ilya, 1999. "Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(1), pages 57-82, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Eric Maskin & John Moore, 1999. "Implementation and Renegotiation," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1863, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
   Other versions:
   • Maskin, Eric & Moore, John, 1999. "Implementation and Renegotiation," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(1), pages 39-56, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Georg Nöldeke & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1992. "Option Contracts and Renegotiation - A Solution to the Hold-Up Problem," Discussion Paper Serie A 417, University of Bonn, Germany, revised Aug 1993.
   Other versions:
   • Georg Noldeke & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1995. "Option Contracts and Renegotiation: A Solution to the Hold-Up Problem," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(2), pages 163-179, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1999. "Foundations of Incomplete Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(1), pages 115-38, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1998. "Foundations of Incomplete Contracts," NBER Working Papers 6726, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1998. "Foundations of Incomplete Contracts," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1846, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
5. Kalai, Ehud & Ledyard, John O., 1998. "Repeated Implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 308-317, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Ehud Kalai & John O. Ledyard, 1997. "Repeated Implementation," Discussion Papers 1205, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
   • Kalai, Ehud & Ledyard, John, 1997. "Repeated Implementation," Working Papers 1027, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
6. Georg Noeldeke & Klaus Schmidt, 1998. "Sequential Investments and Options to Own," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Nöldeke, Georg & Schmidt, Klaus M., 1997. "Sequential Investments and Options to Own," CEPR Discussion Papers 1645, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Georg Noeldeke & Klaus Schmidt, 1998. "Sequential Investments and Options to Own," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(4), pages 633-653, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1988. "Subgame Perfect Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1191-1220, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Luca Anderlini, Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite, . "Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies," Working Papers gueconwpa~03-03-26, Georgetown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite, 2001. "Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies," PIER Working Paper Archive 06-001, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Jan 2006. [Downloadable!]
   • Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2001. "Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies," CEPR Discussion Papers 2835, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite, 2003. "Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 447, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
   • Andrew Postlewaite, 2007. "Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 23(3), pages 662-684, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Yeon-Koo Che & Donald B. Hausch, 1999. "Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 125-147, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Maskin, Eric, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Eric Maskin, 1998. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
11. Edlin, Aaron S & Hermalin, Benjamin E, 2000. "Contract Renegotiation and Options in Agency Problems," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(2), pages 395-423, October.
12. Thomas P. Lyon & Eric Rasmusen, 2001. "Option Contracts and Renegotiation in Complex Environments," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-118, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
13. Alan Schwartz & Joel Watson, . "The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting," Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working Paper Series yale_lepp-1004, Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Alan Schwartz & Joel Watson, 2001. "The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 2001-21, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
    • Alan Schwartz, 2004. "The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 20(1), pages 2-31, April.

Cited by:
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1. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2004. "AGREEING NOW TO AGREE LATER: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series /2004/472, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2004. "Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2032, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
   • Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2004. "Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In," NBER Working Papers 10397, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2004. "Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In," ESE Discussion Papers 109, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
2. Joel Watson, 2006. "Contract and Game Theory: Basic Concepts for Settings with Finite Horizons," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 2006-01, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
3. Bernhard Ganglmair, 2008. "Breakup of Repeat Transaction Contracts, Specific Investment, and Efficient Rent-Seeking," JEPS Working Papers 08-001, JEPS. [Downloadable!]
4. Roberto Serrano, 2004. "On Watson’s Non-Forcing Contracts and Renegotiation," Working Papers 2004-03, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Roberto Serrano, 2009. "On Watson'S Non-Forcing Contracts And Renegotiation," Working Papers wp2009_0907, CEMFI. [Downloadable!]
   • Roberto Serrano, 2004. "On Watson's Non-Forcing Contracts and Renegotiation," Economics Working Papers 0041, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
5. Jim Brennan & Joel Watson, 2002. "The Renegotiation-Proofness Principle and Costly Renegotiation," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 2002-10, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
6. Joel Watson, 2006. "Contract, Mechanism Design, and Technological Detail," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 2002-04R, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
7. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2006. "Book Review of “Contract Theory” (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005)," MPRA Paper 6977, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
8. Alan Schwartz & Joel Watson, . "The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting," Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working Paper Series yale_lepp-1004, Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Alan Schwartz & Joel Watson, 2001. "The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 2001-21, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
   • Alan Schwartz, 2004. "The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 20(1), pages 2-31, April.
9. Thomas P. Lyon & Eric Rasmusen, 2004. "Buyer-Option Contracts Restored: Renegotiation, Inefficient Threats, and the Hold-Up Problem," Working Papers 2004-10, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Thomas P. Lyon, 2004. "Buyer-Option Contracts Restored: Renegotiation, Inefficient Threats, and the Hold-Up Problem," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 20(1), pages 148-169, April.