On Watson's Non-Forcing Contracts and Renegotiation

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

On Watson's Non-Forcing Contracts and Renegotiation

Author Info

Roberto Serrano () (Department of Economics, Brown University)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Roberto Serrano

Abstract

Watson (2002) proposes non-forcing contracts as a way to show the limitations of the mechanism design program with ex-post renegotiation (Maskin and Moore (1999)). If one takes a partial implementation approach, as Watson does, we show that non-forcing contracts do not constitute an intermediate paradigm between implementation with no renegotiation and with ex-post renegotiation. Moreover, taking a full implementation approach, non-forcing contracts fail if and only if one goes outside of the constraints identified by Maskin and Moore, because of the appearance of undesirable equilibria.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science in its series Economics Working Papers with number 0041.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length: 9 pages
Date of creation: May 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ads:wpaper:0041

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Einstein Drive,Princeton, NJ 08540
Phone: 609-734-8250
Fax: 609-951-4457
Web page: http://www.sss.ias.edu/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Nancy Cotterman).

Other versions of this item:

Paper
- Roberto Serrano, 2004. "On Watson’s Non-Forcing Contracts and Renegotiation," Working Papers 2004-03, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Segal, Ilya, 1999. "Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(1), pages 57-82, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Eric Maskin & John Moore, 1999. "Implementation and Renegotiation," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1863, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
Other versions:
- Maskin, Eric & Moore, John, 1999. "Implementation and Renegotiation," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(1), pages 39-56, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ilya Segal & Michael D. Whinston, 2002. "The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism Design with Renegotiation (with Applications to Hold-up and Risk Sharing)," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(1), pages 1-45, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Joel Watson, 2002. "Contract, Mechanism Design, and Technological Detail," Theory workshop papers 505798000000000006, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Joel Watson, 2002. "Contract, Mechanism Design, and Technological Detail," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 2002-04, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
Hart, Oliver D & Moore, John, 1988. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 755-85, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Hardman Moore, John & Hart, Oliver, 1985. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," CEPR Discussion Papers 60, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1985. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Working papers 367, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
Yeon-Koo Che & Donald B. Hausch, 1999. "Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 125-147, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Edlin, Aaron S & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1996. "Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 478-501, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Aaron Edlin & Stefan Reichelstein, 1995. "Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1155, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Aaron S. Edlin & Stefan Reichelstein, 1997. "Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment," NBER Working Papers 5007, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You may want to explore EconPapers, which displays the same data as IDEAS in a different way.

This page was last updated on 2008-12-15.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.