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Economic design, adjustment processes, mechanisms, and institutions

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Author Info
Leonid Hurwicz

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF02716611
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Design.

Volume (Year): 1 (1994)
Issue (Month): 1 (December)
Pages: 1-14
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Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:1:y:1994:i:1:p:1-14

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Groves, Theodore & Ledyard, John O, 1977. "Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(4), pages 783-809, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Osana, Hiroaki, 1978. "On the informational size of message spaces for resource allocation processes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 66-78, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Palfrey, Thomas R & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1991. "Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 479-501, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1974. "Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(2), pages 219-55, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Calsamiglia, Xavier, 1977. "Decentralized resource allocation and increasing returns," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 263-283, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1988. "Subgame Perfect Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1191-1220, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Mount, Kenneth & Reiter, Stanley, 1974. "The informational size of message spaces," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 161-192, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Schmeidler, David, 1980. "Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(7), pages 1585-93, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Reichelstein, Stefan & Reiter, Stanley, 1988. "Game Forms with Minimal Message Spaces," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(3), pages 661-92, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Marschak, Thomas A., 2005. "Organization design," Handbook of Mathematical Economics, in: K. J. Arrow & M.D. Intriligator (ed.), Handbook of Mathematical Economics, edition 2, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1359-1440 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Karni, Edi & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2005. "David Schmeidler," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 1-2, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Saari, Donald G., 1984. "A method for constructing message systems for smooth performance functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 249-274, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Saijo, Tatsuyoshi, 1988. "Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(3), pages 693-700, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Matthew 0. Jackson, 1989. "Implementation in Undominated Strategies - A Look at Bounded Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 833, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  15. Stanley Reiter & Jonathan Hughes, 1980. "A Preface on Modelling the Regulated U.S. Economy," Discussion Papers 424, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  16. Kenneth R. Mount & Stanley Reiter, 1983. "On the Existence of a Locally Stable Dynamic Process With a Statically Minimal Message Space," Discussion Papers 550, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Full references

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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Jackson, Matthew O. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 1999. "Voluntary Implementation," Working Papers 1077, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Trockel,W., 1999. "Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory," Working Papers 305, Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Ruys, P.H.M., 2002. "A managed service economy with an equilibrium for marketable services," Discussion Paper 1, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  4. Agnès Festré & Pierre Garrouste, 2007. "L'Analyse Economique des Normes Sociales: una Réévaluation de l'Héritage Hayékien," ICER Working Papers 45-2007, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. John Ledyard & Charles Noussair & David Porter, 1996. "The allocation of a shared resource within an organization," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 163-192, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Andreas Pfingsten & Andreas Wagener, 1997. "Centralized vs. Decentralized Redistribution: A Case for Interregional Transfer Mechanisms," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 429-451, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Roberto Serrano, 2004. "Fifty Years of the Nash Program, 1953-2003," Working Papers 2004-20, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Herbert Dawid & Joern Dermietzel, 2006. "How Robust is the Equal Split Norm? Responsive Strategies, Selection Mechanisms and the Need for Economic Interpretation of Simulation Parameters," Computational Economics, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 371-397, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Trockel,W., 2001. "Can and should the Nash program be looked at as a part of mechanism theory?," Working Papers 322, Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. Joel Watson, 2006. "Contract, Mechanism Design, and Technological Detail," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 2002-04R, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
  11. Walter Trockel, 1999. "On the Nash Program for the Nash Bargaining Solution," UCLA Economics Working Papers 788, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Jernej Copic & Clara Ponsati, 2003. "Implementation by Decent Mechanisms," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000275, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  13. Joel Watson, 2006. "Contract and Game Theory: Basic Concepts for Settings with Finite Horizons," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 2006-01, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
  14. Thorsten Koeppl & Cyril Monnet & Erwan Quintin, 2008. "Efficient institutions," Working Papers 08-33, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. [Downloadable!]
  15. Agnès Festré & Pierre Garrouste, 2009. "The economic analysis of social norms: A reappraisal of Hayek's legacy," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00346389_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  16. Matthew O. Jackson & Simon Wilkie, 2002. "Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players," Microeconomics 0211008, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  17. Claus-Jochen Haake & Walter Trockel, 2007. "On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules," Working Papers 393, Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics. [Downloadable!]
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