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Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation

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Author Info
Saijo, Tatsuyoshi

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Abstract

Contributions by E. Maskin and S. Williams have established that any social choice cor respondence satisfying monotonicity, no veto power, and having at lea st three participants is Nash implementable under the proviso that th e number of social alternatives is finite and that the correspondence satisfies citizen sovereignty. The author makes improvements in two aspects of their Nash implementation theorems: a reduction in the str ategy space and a proof for an arbitrary alternative set. Each partic ipant announces two participants' preferences, an alternative, and a positive integer. With this strategy space specification, the author confirms Maskin's theorem for an arbitrary size of the alternative se t. Copyright 1988 by The Econometric Society.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 56 (1988)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
Pages: 693-700
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:56:y:1988:i:3:p:693-700

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  1. Gabrielle Demange, 2001. "On stability and incentives in hierarchies," DELTA Working Papers 2001-09, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
  2. Sang-Chul Suh, 1994. "A mechanism implementing the proportional solution," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 301-317, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Pablo Amorós, 2006. "Eliciting Socially Optimal Rankings from Unfair Jurors," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2006/10, Centro de Estudios Andaluces. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Eiichi Miyagawa, 2002. "The relation between implementability and the core," Discussion Papers 0102-64, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Matthew O. Jackson, 1990. "Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 966, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Lu Hong & Scott Page, 1994. "Reducing informational costs in endowment mechanisms," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 103-117, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Leonid Hurwicz, 1994. "Economic design, adjustment processes, mechanisms, and institutions," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 1-14, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Eiichi Miyagawa, 2002. "Reduced-form implementation," Discussion Papers 0203-09, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Bhaskar Dutta & Arunava Sen & Rajiv Vohra, 1994. "Nash implementation through elementary mechanisms in economic environments," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 173-203, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Luis Corchon & Ignacio Ortuño-Ortin, 1994. "Robust implementation under alternative information structures," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 159-171, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. William Thomson, 2004. "Divide-and-Permute," RCER Working Papers 510, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER). [Downloadable!]
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  12. Koray, Semih & Saglam, Ismail, 1997. "Justifiability of Bayesian Implementation in Oligopolistic Markets," MPRA Paper 4459, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  13. Matthew O. Jackson, 1988. "Full Bayesian Implementation," Discussion Papers 791, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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