Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

The theory of implementation : what did we learn?

Contents:

Author Info

  • Luis C. Corchon

    ()

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://e-archivo.uc3m.es/bitstream/10016/2172/1/we081207.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía in its series Economics Working Papers with number we081207.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Dec 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cte:werepe:we081207

Contact details of provider:
Postal: C./ Madrid, 126, 28903 Getafe (Madrid)
Phone: +34-91 6249594
Fax: +34-91 6249329
Email:
Web page: http://www.eco.uc3m.es
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Matthew O. Jackson, 2001. "A crash course in implementation theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 655-708.
  2. Matthew 0. Jackson, 1989. "Implementation in Undominated Strategies - A Look at Bounded Mechanisms," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 833, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  3. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2008. "Role of honesty in full implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 353-359, March.
  4. Dino Gerardi & Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2005. "Aggregation of Expert Opinions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 1503, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  5. Paul Klemperer, 1999. "Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature," Microeconomics, EconWPA 9903002, EconWPA.
  6. Saari, Donald G., 1987. "The source of some paradoxes from social choice and probability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 1-22, February.
  7. Kalai, Ehud & Ledyard, John O., 1998. "Repeated Implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 308-317, December.
  8. AlvinE. Roth, 2008. "What Have We Learned from Market Design?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(527), pages 285-310, 03.
  9. Baliga, S. & Corchon, L.C. & Sjostrom, T., 1995. "The Theory of Implemetation when the Planner is a PLayer," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge 9512, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  10. Pablo Amorós, 2003. "Nash Implementation and Uncertain Renegotiation," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2003/27, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
  11. Eliaz, K., 1999. "Fault Tolerant Implementation," Papers, Tel Aviv 21-99, Tel Aviv.
  12. Vijay Krishna & Motty Perry, 1997. "Efficient Mechanism Design," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 9703010, EconWPA, revised 28 Apr 1998.
  13. Roberto Serrano, 2003. "The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules," Economics Working Papers, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science 0033, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  14. Rubinstein, Ariel & Wolinsky, Asher, 1992. "Renegotiation-Proof Implementation and Time Preferences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 600-614, June.
  15. Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1988. "Subgame Perfect Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1191-1220, September.
  16. Luis Corchón & M. Socorro Puy, 2000. "- Existence And Nash Implementation Of Efficient Sharing Rules For A Commonly Owned Technology," Working Papers. Serie AD, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) 2000-03, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  17. Hurwicz, Leonid, 1979. "On allocations attainable through Nash equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 140-165, August.
  18. Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Tatamitani, Yoshikatsu & Yamato, Takehiko, 1996. "Toward Natural Implementation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 37(4), pages 949-80, November.
  19. Bhaskar Dutta & Arunava Sen & Rajiv Vohra, 1994. "Nash implementation through elementary mechanisms in economic environments," Review of Economic Design, Springer, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 173-203, December.
  20. Muller, Eitan & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1977. "The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 412-418, April.
  21. Sandholm, William H., 2007. "Pigouvian pricing and stochastic evolutionary implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 367-382, January.
  22. Moulin, Herve, 1979. "Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 47(6), pages 1137-51, November.
  23. Stephen Morris & Dirk Bergemann, 2004. "Robust Mechanism Design," Yale School of Management Working Papers, Yale School of Management ysm380, Yale School of Management.
  24. Palfrey, Thomas R & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1989. "Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 57(1), pages 115-34, January.
  25. Saijo, Tatsuyoshi, 1988. "Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 56(3), pages 693-700, May.
  26. Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1990. "Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 58(5), pages 1083-99, September.
  27. Yamato Takehiko, 1993. "Double Implementation in Nash and Undominated Nash Equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 311-323, April.
  28. Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2001. "Implementation Theory," Working Papers, Pennsylvania State University, Department of Economics 5-01-1, Pennsylvania State University, Department of Economics.
  29. William Thomson, 2004. "Divide-and-Permute," RCER Working Papers 510, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  30. José Alcalde Pérez & Luis Corchón & Bernardo Moreno Jiménez, 1996. "Pigouvian taxes: A strategic approach," Working Papers. Serie AD, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) 1996-17, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  31. Saijo, Tatsuyoshi, 1991. "Incentive compatibility and individual rationality in public good economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 203-212, October.
  32. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 1997. "Non-cooperative implementation of the core," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 513-525.
  33. Hammond, Peter J, 1987. "Markets as Constraints: Multilateral Incentive Compatibility in Continuum Economies," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(3), pages 399-412, July.
  34. Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(114), pages 175-208, April.
  35. Antonio Cabrales, . "Adaptive Dynamics and the Implementation Problem with Complete Information," ELSE working papers, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution 009, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
  36. Chattopadhyay, Subir & Corchon, Luis & Naeve, Jorg, 2000. "Contingent commodities and implementation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 68(3), pages 293-298, September.
  37. Reiter, Stanley, 1977. "Information and Performance in the (New)2 Welfare Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 67(1), pages 226-34, February.
  38. Corchon, Luis & Faulí-Oller, Ramon, 1999. "To Merge or Not To Merge: That is the Question," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 2190, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  39. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-31, July.
  40. Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano & Oscar Volij, 1995. "Feasible Implementation of Taxation Methods," Working Papers 95-14, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  41. Georgy Artemov & Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Robust virtual implementation with incomplete information: Towards a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine," Working Papers, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales 2007-14, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
  42. Palfrey, Thomas R., 2002. "Implementation theory," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 61, pages 2271-2326 Elsevier.
  43. Sjostrom, T., 1991. "Implementation in Undominated Nash Equilibria without Integer Games," Papers, Stockholm - International Economic Studies 491, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
  44. Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983. "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April.
  45. Ma, Ching-to & Moore, John & Turnbull, Stephen, 1988. "Stopping agents from "cheating"," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 355-372, December.
  46. Postlewaite, Andrew & Schmeidler, David, 1986. "Implementation in differential information economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 14-33, June.
  47. Harris Milton & Townsend, Robert M, 1981. "Resource Allocation under Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 49(1), pages 33-64, January.
  48. d'Aspremont, Claude & Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre, 1979. "Incentives and incomplete information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 25-45, February.
  49. Francisco Candel-Sánchez, 2004. "Dynamic provision of public goods," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 621-641, March.
  50. Jackson, Matthew O. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 1999. "Voluntary Implementation," Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences 1077, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  51. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1988. "A new approach to the implementation problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 128-144, June.
  52. Danilov, Vladimir, 1992. "Implementation via Nash Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 60(1), pages 43-56, January.
  53. Roger B. Myerson, 1977. "Incentive Compatability and the Bargaining Problem," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 284, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  54. Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2002. "Inefficiency of Strategy-Proof Rules for Pure Exchange Economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 219-241, October.
  55. Serrano, Roberto & Vohra, Rajiv, 2001. "Some Limitations of Virtual Bayesian Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 69(3), pages 785-92, May.
  56. Tian Guoqiang & Li Qi, 1995. "On Nash-Implementation in the Presence of Withholding," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 222-233, May.
  57. Barbera, S. & Peleg, B., 1988. "Strategy-Proof Voting Schemes With Continuous Preferences," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 91.88, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  58. Bezalel Peleg, 1996. "Double implementation of the Lindahl equilibrium by a continuous mechanism," Review of Economic Design, Springer, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 311-324, December.
  59. Harsanyi, John C, 1995. "Games with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 291-303, June.
  60. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
  61. Matteo Triossi & Luis Corchón, 2006. "Implementation with State Dependent Feasible Sets and Preferences: A Renegotiation Approach," Carlo Alberto Notebooks, Collegio Carlo Alberto 24, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
  62. Schmeidler, David, 1980. "Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 48(7), pages 1585-93, November.
  63. Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 1991. "A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(1), pages 121-28, January.
  64. Jackson Matthew O. & Palfrey Thomas R. & Srivastava Sanjay, 1994. "Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 474-501, May.
  65. Serizawa, Shigehiro & Weymark, John A., 2003. "Efficient strategy-proof exchange and minimum consumption guarantees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 246-263, April.
  66. Sen, Arunava, 2001. "Another direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 381-385, March.
  67. David P�rez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2002. "Choosing Wisely: A Multibidding Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1577-1587, December.
  68. Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Tomas Sjostrom & Takehiko Yamato, 2005. "Secure Implementation," Economics Working Papers, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science 0056, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  69. Thomson, W., 1994. "Concepts of Implementation," RCER Working Papers 396, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  70. Mookherjee, Dilip & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1990. "Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(3), pages 453-75, July.
  71. Dasgupta, Partha S & Hammond, Peter J & Maskin, Eric S, 1979. "The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 185-216, April.
  72. Luis Corchón & Bhaskar Chakravorti & Simon Wilkie, 1993. "Credible Implementation," Working Papers. Serie AD, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) 1993-02, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  73. Makowski Louis & Mezzetti Claudio, 1993. "The Possibility of Efficient Mechanisms for Trading an Indivisible Object," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 451-465, April.
  74. Hong, Lu, 1998. "Feasible Bayesian Implementation with State Dependent Feasible Sets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 201-221, June.
  75. Palfrey, Thomas R & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1987. "On Bayesian Implementable Allocations," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(2), pages 193-208, April.
  76. Williams, Steven R, 1986. "Realization and Nash Implementation: Two Aspects of Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 54(1), pages 139-51, January.
  77. Benoit, Jean-Pierre, 2000. "The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a simple proof," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 319-322, December.
  78. Salvador Barbera & Hugo Sonnenschein & Lin Zhou, 1990. "Voting by Committees," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 941, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  79. Walker, Mark, 1981. "A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 49(1), pages 65-71, January.
  80. Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 1991. "Implementation under strong equilibrium : A complete characterization," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 49-67.
  81. Sertel, Murat R. & Sanver, M. Remzi, 1999. "Equilibrium outcomes of Lindahl-endowment pretension games1," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 149-162, June.
  82. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
  83. Semih Koray & Ismail Saglam, 2005. "The Need for Regulating a Bayesian Regulator," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 5-21, 07.
  84. Jackson, Matthew O, 1991. "Bayesian Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 461-77, March.
  85. Postlewaite, Andrew, 1979. "Manipulation via Endowments," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 255-62, April.
  86. Barbera, S. & Sonnenschein, H., 1988. "Voting By Quota And Committee," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 95-88, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  87. Barbera, Salvador, 1983. "Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 24(2), pages 413-17, June.
  88. Spence, A Michael, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-74, August.
  89. Loeb, Martin & Magat, Wesley A, 1979. "A Decentralized Method for Utility Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 399-404, October.
  90. John Ledyard & John Roberts, 1975. "On the Incentive Problem with Public Goods," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 116, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cte:werepe:we081207. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: () The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask to update the entry or send us the correct address.

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.