Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results

Contents:

Author Info

  • Lombardi, Michele
  • Yoshihara, Naoki

Abstract

This paper studies implementation problems in the wake of a recent new trend of implementation theory which incorporates a non-consequentialist flavor of the evidence from experimental and behavioral economics into the issues. Specifically, following the seminal works by Matsushima (2008) and Dutta and Sen (2009), the paper considers implementation problems with partially honest agents, which presume that there exists at least one individual in the society who concerns herself with not only outcomes but also honest behavior at least in a limited manner. Given this setting, the paper provides a general characterization of Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals. It also provides the necessary and sufficient condition for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals by mechanisms with some types of strategy-space reductions. As a consequence, it shows that, in contrast to the case of the standard framework, the equivalence between Nash implementation and Nash implementation with strategy space reduction no longer holds.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28838/
File Function: original version
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 28838.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 13 Feb 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:28838

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Schackstr. 4, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2219
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3900
Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Nash implementation; canonical-mechanisms; s-mechanisms; self-relevant mechanisms; partial-honesty; permissive results.;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2013. "Partially Honest Nash Implementation:A Full Characterization," CCES Discussion Paper Series 49, Center for Research on Contemporary Economic Systems, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  2. Koray, Semih & Sertel, Murat, 1991. "A necessary and sufficient condition for two-person Nash implementation : B. Dutta and A. Sen, Review of economic studies 58 (1991), 121-128," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 620-620, November.
  3. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2006. "Role of Honesty in Full Implementation," CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo CIRJE-F-405, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  4. Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2002. "Implementation theory," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Elsevier, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 237-288 Elsevier.
  5. Benoît, Jean-Pierre & Ok, Efe A., 2008. "Nash implementation without no-veto power," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 51-67, September.
  6. Michele Lombardi & Naoki Yoshihara, 2013. "A full characterization of nash implementation with strategy space reduction," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 131-151, September.
  7. Kartik, Navin & Tercieux, Olivier, 2012. "Implementation with evidence," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 7(2), May.
  8. Eliaz, Kfir, 2002. "Fault Tolerant Implementation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(3), pages 589-610, July.
  9. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2011. "Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results," Discussion Paper Series, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University 555, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  10. Uri Gneezy, 2005. "Deception: The Role of Consequences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 384-394, March.
  11. Amartya Sen, 1996. "Maximization and the Act of Choice," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1766, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  12. Cabrales, Antonio & Charness, Gary & Corchon, Luis C., 2003. "An experiment on Nash implementation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 161-193, June.
  13. Luis Corchón & Carmen Herrero, 2004. "A decent proposal," Spanish Economic Review, Springer, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 107-125, 07.
  14. Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 1991. "A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(1), pages 121-28, January.
  15. Yamato, Takehiko, 1992. "On nash implementation of social choice correspondences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 484-492, July.
  16. Tyran, Jean-Robert, 2003. "Behavioral Game Theory. Experiments in Strategic Interaction: Colin F. Camerer, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 2003, p. 550, Price $65.00/[UK pound]42.95, ISBN 0-691-09039-4," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 32(6), pages 717-720, December.
  17. Jackson, Matthew O, 1992. "Implementation in Undominated.Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(4), pages 757-75, October.
  18. Tatamitani, Yoshikatsu, 2002. "Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms: applications," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 253-276, December.
  19. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Olivier Tercieux, 2010. "Rationalizable Implementation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 1697R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  20. Danilov, Vladimir, 1992. "Implementation via Nash Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 60(1), pages 43-56, January.
  21. Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1990. "Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 58(5), pages 1083-99, September.
  22. Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 2009. "Nash Implementation with Partially Honest Individuals," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 920, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  23. Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Tatamitani, Yoshikatsu & Yamato, Takehiko, 1996. "Toward Natural Implementation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 37(4), pages 949-80, November.
  24. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2012. "Natural Implementation with Partially Honest Agents," Discussion Paper Series, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University 561, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  25. Sjaak Hurkens & Navin Kartik, 2009. "Would I lie to you? On social preferences and lying aversion," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 180-192, June.
  26. Jackson, Matthew O., 1999. "A Crash Course in Implementation Theory," Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences 1076, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  27. Bhaskar Dutta & Arunava Sen & Rajiv Vohra, 1994. "Nash implementation through elementary mechanisms in economic environments," Review of Economic Design, Springer, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 173-203, December.
  28. Francesca Busetto & Giulio Codognato, 2009. "Reconsidering two-agent Nash implementation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 171-179, February.
  29. Roberto Serrano & Antonio Cabrales, 2007. "Implemetation In Adaptive Better-Response Dynamics," Working Papers, CEMFI wp2007_0708, CEMFI.
  30. Pazner, Elisha A & Schmeidler, David, 1978. "Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations: A New Concept of Economic Equity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 92(4), pages 671-87, November.
  31. Saijo, Tatsuyoshi, 1988. "Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 56(3), pages 693-700, May.
  32. Maskin, Eric, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38, January.
  33. Tatamitani, Yoshikatsu, 2001. "Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 427-444, June.
  34. Hannu Vartiainen, 2007. "Nash implementation and the bargaining problem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 333-351, September.
  35. Glazer, Jacob & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1998. "Motives and Implementation: On the Design of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 157-173, April.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Michele Lombardi, 2012. "Nash implementation via simple stochastic mechanisms: strategy space reduction," Review of Economic Design, Springer, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 297-309, December.
  2. Ahmed Doghmi & Abderrahmane Ziad, 2013. "Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Single-Plateaued Preferences," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen), Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS 201311, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
  3. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2011. "Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results," MPRA Paper 28838, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Kartik, Navin & Tercieux, Olivier & Holden, Richard, 2014. "Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 284-290.
  5. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2011. "A Full Characterization of Nash Implementation with Strategy Space Reduction," Discussion Paper Series, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University a548, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  6. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2013. "Natural implementation with partially honest agents in economic environments," MPRA Paper 48294, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Lombardi Michele & Yoshihara Naoki, 2012. "Natural implementation with partially hones agents," Research Memorandum 005, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  8. Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 2012. "Nash implementation with partially honest individuals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 154-169.
  9. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2013. "Partially Honest Nash Implementation:A Full Characterization," CCES Discussion Paper Series 49, Center for Research on Contemporary Economic Systems, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  10. Ahmed Doghmi, 2013. "Nash Implementation in an Allocation Problem with Single-Dipped Preferences," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(1), pages 38-49, January.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:28838. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.