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Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Single-Plateaued Preferences

Author

Listed:
  • Ahmed Doghmi

    (National Institute of Statistics and Applied Economics of Rabat, Morocco)

  • Abderrahmane Ziad

    (Normandie University, Caen, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration - CREM CNRS UMR6211, France)

Abstract

In this paper we explore the problem of Nash implementation providing new sufficient conditions called I-monotonicity and I-weak no-veto power. Firstly, we show that these conditions together with unanimity are sufficient for the implementation of social choice correspondences (SCCs) in Nash equilibria. Secondly, we prove that, in the domain of the private good economies with single-plateaued preferences, a solution of the problem of fair division is Nash implementable if and only if it satisfies Maskin monotonicity. We provide examples of SCCs satisfying or not Maskin monotonicity.

Suggested Citation

  • Ahmed Doghmi & Abderrahmane Ziad, 2013. "Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Single-Plateaued Preferences," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201311, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
    • Handle: RePEc:tut:cremwp:201311
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 2012. "Nash implementation with partially honest individuals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 154-169.
    2. William Thomson, 2010. "Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 14(1), pages 1-15, March.
    3. Barbera, Salvador & Jackson, Matthew O. & Neme, Alejandro, 1997. "Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-21, January.
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    5. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2008. "Role of honesty in full implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 353-359, March.
    6. Doghmi Ahmed & Ziad Abderrahmane, 2013. "On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(1), pages 1-14, September.
    7. Eric Maskin, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38.
    8. Ahmed Doghmi & Abderrahmane ZIAD, 2012. "On Partial Honesty Nash Implementation," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201201, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
    9. Lars Ehlers, 2002. "Strategy-proof allocation when preferences are single-plateaued," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 7(1), pages 105-115.
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    11. Doghmi, Ahmed & Ziad, Abderrahmane, 2008. "Reexamination of Maskin's Theorem on Nash implementability," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 150-152, July.
    12. Doghmi, Ahmed & Ziad, Abderrahmane, 2008. "Nash implementation in exchange economies with single-peaked preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 157-160, July.
    13. Danilov, Vladimir, 1992. "Implementation via Nash Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(1), pages 43-56, January.
    14. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2008. "Behavioral aspects of implementation theory," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 161-164, July.
    15. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki & 吉原, 直毅, 2011. "Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results," CCES Discussion Paper Series 43, Center for Research on Contemporary Economic Systems, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
    16. H. Moulin, 1980. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 437-455, January.
    17. Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1990. "Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(5), pages 1083-1099, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Doghmi, Ahmed & Ziad, Abderrahmane, 2015. "Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 32-39.
    2. Diss, Mostapha & Doghmi, Ahmed & Tlidi, Abdelmonaim, 2015. "Strategy proofness and unanimity in private good economies with single-peaked preferences," MPRA Paper 75469, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 Dec 2016.
    3. Doghmi Ahmed & Ziad Abderrahmane, 2013. "On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(1), pages 1-14, September.
    4. Doghmi Ahmed, 2014. "Nash Implementation in Rationing Problems with Single-Crossing Preferences," Mathematical Economics Letters, De Gruyter, vol. 1(2-4), pages 1-6, July.
    5. Doghmi Ahmed, 2016. "On Nash Implementability in Allotment Economies under Domain Restrictions with Indifference," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 16(2), pages 767-795, June.
    6. Doghmi Ahmed, 2013. "Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies when Preferences are Single-Dipped with Best Indifferent Allocations," Mathematical Economics Letters, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 35-42, October.
    7. Doghmi, Ahmed, 2011. "A Simple Necessary Condition for Partially Honest Nash Implementation," MPRA Paper 67231, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 14 Oct 2015.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Nash implementation; Private good economies; Single-plateaued preferences;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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