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Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty

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  • Kartik, Navin
  • Tercieux, Olivier
  • Holden, Richard

Abstract

We consider full implementation in complete-information environments when agents have an arbitrarily small preference for honesty. We offer a condition called separable punishment and show that when it holds and there are at least two agents, any social choice function can be implemented by a simple mechanism in two rounds of iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 83 (2014)
Issue (Month): C ()
Pages: 284-290

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:83:y:2014:i:c:p:284-290

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

Related research

Keywords: Behavioral mechanism design; Implementation; Lying costs; Separable domain;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Ahmed Doghmi, 2013. "Nash Implementation in an Allocation Problem with Single-Dipped Preferences," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(1), pages 38-49, January.
  2. Michael T. Rauh & Giulio Seccia, 2014. "Honesty and Trade," Working Papers, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy 2014-06, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
  3. Alejandro Saporiti, 2014. "Securely Implementable Social Choice Rules with Partially Honest Agents," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series, Economics, The University of Manchester 1402, Economics, The University of Manchester.
  4. Midjord, Rune, 2012. "Full Implementation of Rank Dependent Prizes," DFAEII Working Papers 2012-15, University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II.
  5. Abeler, Johannes & Becker, Anke & Falk, Armin, 2014. "Representative evidence on lying costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 96-104.

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